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C. A. HUNDERTMARK is a Ph.D. candidate in American Studies at
UNM. His dissertation will concern reclamation in New Mexico.

In this issue NMHR has opened its pages to a discussion of the 1934
Senatorial election in New Mexico. T. PHILLIP WOLF, Chairman of the
Division of Social Sciences at Indiana State University Southeast, Jeffersonville, challenges WILLIAM H. PICKENS' interpretations in his article,
"Bronson Cutting vs. Dennis Chavez: Battle of the Patrones in New
Mexico, 1934" (NMHR, Vol. 46, No. I, Jan. 1971). Copies of Professor
Wolf's critique and Mr. Pickens' reply sent to G. 1. SELIGMANN, JR., Associate Professor of History at North Texas State University, Denton,
inspired "Yet Another View." Professor Seligmann wrote: "When I read
Mr. Pickens' original article I realized his views on the 1934 Senatorial
election and mine differed somewhat. This difference I attributed to my
having used the Cutting manuscripts in toto while Pickens has used my
dissertation and, as inevitably happens, something was lost in translation.
Then came Professor Wolf's critique which I found interesting and even
occasionally useful. I was at a loss on how to integrate the two into a
meaningful whole. Then came Pickens II which got to the heart of the
matter with some vigor. It was then that I decided to write still another
account of the 1934 election. Hopefully the result will cast some light on
this very important election from yet another angle. With a little luck it
will also'serve to illustrate how very little we know about New Mexico in
this century and encourage others to peer about in its fascinating nooks
and crannies."
With regard to the future the Editor must issue a warning. Although we
wish to receive our readers' opinions, favorable or unfavorable, it may not
be possible to find more than limited space for a Department of Amplification, Correction, or Abuse.
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RECLAMATION IN CHAVES
AND EDDY COUNTIES,

1887-1912

C. A. HUNDERTMARK

recurs countless times in the arid Southwest. Torrential rain in the high country runs down slopes incapable of
absorbing the sudden deluge and fills normally dry arroyos. Down
the arroyos the water rushes to swell the flow of perennial streams.
Extensive overgrazing, denuding slopes and reducing even more
the capacity of the land to hold the rush of rain water, aggravates
the problem. Perennial streams, their channels brimming or overflowing, surge to rivers like the Pecos and add their muddy burden.
to the growing flood tide. In the fall of 1904 the pattern repeated
itself twice in the Pecos Valley of New Mexico. In the last days of
September the waters of the Rio Hondo filled the streets of Roswell
for two days. South of Roswell, the Rio Felix and Rio Penasco
added their silt-laden waters to the mounting flood of the Pecos,
building a restless sea behind McMillan Dam. Built with limited
private capital and designed to serve only the purpose of irrigation
storage, McMillan Dam was ill suited to hold back the seaward
rush of a Pecos flood. Relentlessly pressing toward union with the
Rio Grande and the sea, the muddy waters carried out two
hundred feet of the McMillan spillway and surged onward to
destroy a 400-foot section' of the smaller Avalon Dam downstream.
Canals and other facilities of the irrigation system were also
damaged.
Natural disasters are often bad business for farmers and good
business for reclamation engineers. Such was the case with the
1904 Pecos flood. For the Pecos Irrigation Company, successor to
a line· of disaster-fraught irrigation companies, the destruction of
THE PATTERN
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Avalon Dam was the executioner's blow. For the settlers on land
served by the company's water, the destruction of the irrigation
facilities struck with the impact of the drouth on the Great Plains
in the 1880'S. Many settlers left their land, and thousanqs of irrigated acres in the Carlsbad area were abandoned in the years
following the flood. For the newly established Federal Reclamation
Service, however, the disaster was an opportunity. Pressed by
Congressional opposition from the outset, the Reclamation Service
had to prove quickly that-it could succeed where private efforts
floundered. Without Federal interference, the Pecos Irrigation
Company might well have failed, leaving settlers to abandon their
land or fall back on small-scale individual and community diversions. But the Reclamation Service bought out the private company's holdings, including the two poorly designed and built
dams, and restored the damaged irrigation facilities within a few
years. There is no indication that the possibility 'of allowing the
irrigation project to fail was even considered.
When the Reclamation Service took over the Carlsbad project,
work was already under way on another reclamation project in the
Pecos basin on the Rio Hondo near Roswell. The Hondo Reservoir
project, however, was a failure from the start, demonstrating that
the Reclamation Service was no less vulnerable to poor judgment
than private industry. With the failure of the Hondo project, the
Carlsbad project was left as the single major Federal irrigation
undertaking in the Pecos basin in New Mexico.
At the national level, the Reclamation Service (now the Bureau
of Reclamation) has come under increasingly heavy attack by both
environmentalists and those concerned with the waste of tax
money on pork-barrel projects. Bureau of Reclamation work in the
Pecos valley of New Mexico typifies many of the reclamation
practices which have drawn public criticism. Work planned to
compensate for deficiencies inherent in the poor deSign of the
Carlsbad project is currently under attack by New Mexico environmentalists. A tree-eradication project, already sixty-per cent
completed, and Los Esteros Dam, to be built north of Santa Rosa,
have already drawn fire from conservation groups. A second dam,
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the Brantley project, has not yet been evaluated by these groups
to my knowledge. Los Esteros Darn is an Army Corps of Engineers project, but it is connected with the Carlsbad project. The
other two projects are Bureau of Reclamation undertakings. The
cost of all three, in dollars and environmental destruction, will be
immense.!
The source of these tensions may be seen in the history of Pecos
Valley water-resources development. The development of water
for irrigation in the valley, achieved in part through Federal reclamation work, was a major factor in the settlement of Chaves
and Eddy counties in southeastern New Mexico from 1887 on.
The development of irrigation facilities in both counties, however, was beset with problems from the beginning. The alliance
between Reclamation Service engineers, pressed to prove their
capabilities, and the promoters of the growing Roswell and Carlsbad communities brought about the premature development of
extensive, but defective irrigation projects. The first Federal reclamation project in the Pecos River basin, the ill-fated Hondo
Reservoir, illustrates the kind of vested-interest pressure which was
to influence reclamation decisions. The failure of that project,
however, kept the loss of public money down to the amount of the
initial investment. On the other hand, the Federal take-over of the
Carlsbad dams and canals put that project on a more stable basis
than had been possible under private ownership, although the
financial and environmental cost to the public promises to continue mounting.
What was to be the first large-scale, successful irrigation undertaking in the Pecos Valley began in 1887 as a private venture.
Whether credit for the idea goes to Pat Garrett or Charles B.
Eddy is debatable. William A. Keleher, following Ash Upson,
credits Garrett with the inspiratioh. Upson was a friend of Garrett
and wrote Garrett's version of the life and death of Billy the Kid
for the one-time Lincoln County sheriff. In 1889 Garrett and Upson were partners in a Roswell real estate company. Garrett purportedly first conceived of a large-scale irrigation project from the
Rio Hondo, where· his ranch was located. The Eddy County
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News, however, favors Eddy as the originator of the irrigation
scheme. Born in New York state, Eddy moved to New Mexico
and took up ranching south of the present Carlsbad, where he
was joined by his brother, John Arthur Eddy. In 1887 Eddy and
his brother, together with Joseph Stevens, Elmer E. Williams, and
Arthur A. Mermod, formed the Pecos Valley Land and Ditch
Company to make an irrigation diversion from the Pecos. In 1888
Eddy's company was reorganized as the Pecos Irrigation and Investment Company, with Eddy and Garrett, along with Santa Fe
New Mexican editor Charles W. Greene, as the major directors
and shareholders. The company's plans included a diversion dam
and canal in the vicinity of Roswell, drawing water from the Rio
Hondo, and two dams and a system of canals to divert water from
the Pecos to serve the area around what is now Carlsbad. It is
possible that Garrett and Eddy each had originally conceived of
more localized plans, then combined their interests. The company
built a diversion dam on the Pecos near the present Avalon Dam
in 1888. The dam on the Hondo, built on the Garrett ranch, four
miles east of Roswell, was completed, together with the Northern
Canal, in 1889 and 1890.2
The Northern Canal, originating on the Rio Hondo between
Roswell and the Pecos, remained the principal effort of the company in Chaves County until its holdings there were sold to
James John Hagerman in 1898. The canal ran south about thirty
miles to the vicinity of Lake Arthur. In Eddy County, a more
extensive system of canals was planned, and the original diversion
dam was to be replaced by two larger reservoirs. McMillan Lake
was to serve as a storage facility, and the downstream structure,
Avalon Dam, would provide additional storage as well as· serving
as a diversion dam. These works were completed in 1894, though
not without some setbacks and the infusion of new capital.
That the undertaking was beyond the financial capabilities of
the original investors became immediately apparent, and Eddy
and Greene bent their talents toward the search for additional
funding. A number of investors were induced to sink money into
the project. The most important among them was James Hager-

HUNDERTMARK: RECLAMATION

305

man, a Canadian-born capitalist then living in Colorado Springs.
Hagerman began investing in the company in 1889 and continued
to put money into the project until, in 1890, he and a group of
associates, whom he had persuaded to invest also, held the controlling interest in the company. At that time the company was
reorganized as the Pecos Irrigation and Improvement Company.
Hagerman was in control and became president in 1892. It was
Hagerman's commitment which kept development going after
Garrett, Greene, and Eddy gave up their interests. Garrett left his
Roswell ranch for Texas around 189 I. Greene was hard hit in the
1893 market crash and sold his interest. The irrigation company
was in financial trouble caused by both the market crash and a flood
which broke Avalon Dam in the same year. Eddy gave up his
shary shortly thereafter. From 1893 to 1898 only the continual
investment of new capital by Hagerman and his friends kept the
company out of receivership.
Despite Hagerman's efforts the company failed and went into
receivership in 1898. Capital to carry out development of the
project had been obtained through sale of two issues of bonds
secured by first and second mortgages on the company's property.
Representatives of the bondholders now took possession of the
company's assets and reorganized as the P~cos Irrigation Company, with one of the bondholders, Francis G. Tracy, as president.
Hagerman gave up his interest in the lower valley (Carlsbad
area) at that time, and devoted himself to his upper-valley
holdings.
Around 1896,. Hagerman had begun to feel that Eddy had
deceived him about the potential of the Pecos Valley in Eddy
County. He began to discriminate between the Eddy County
area, which he termed the lower valley, and the Chaves County,
or upper valley, lands. He decided that the lower valley had no
future, and that only the upper valley was worth attention. With
a growing understanding of scientific irrigation and farming techniques, Hagerman became critical of the leaky canals and what
he considered poor .soils of the lower valley. Poor irrigation practice, he believed, had ruined much of the land. Sub-irrigation
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rendered the land worthless. (The term "sub-irrigation," as Hagerman used it, probably referred to waterlogging.) Hagerman was
disgusted that he had been led to sink his own resources into the
undertaking and that he had induced friends to do the same. With
the reorganization in 1898, the receivers had to raise funds to pay
off certain debts of the old company, and the bondholders would
put no more of their own money into the business. Consequently,
part of the company's holdings had to be sold. Hagerman offered
$50,000 for the Northern Canal and all of the Improvement Company's property and rights in Chaves County. The transaction was
completed, and Hagerman from then on confined his interest in
the valley's development primarily to Chaves County.3
While Garrett, Eddy, and Greene were planning the irrigation
project that was to tie up most of James Hagerman's efforts for
nearly a decade, an engineer, Leslie M. Long, developed an irrigation scheme of his own. Long, surveying the Rio Hondo,
located two potential reservoir sites along the river west of
Roswell. Long and backers from the Roswell area formed the
First New Mexico Reservoir and Irrigation Company in December
1888 and appropriated all of the unappropriated waters of the
Rio Hondo. That the waters of the Hondo had been fully appropriated earlier the same year by the Pecos Irrigation and Investment Company never became an issue in court. The Reservoir and
Irrigation Company did not carry through its development plan,
and, in 1892, the company sold all of its interests and rights to the
Pecos Irrigation and Improvement Company. The Improvement
Company began construction of Hondo reservoir at one of tqe
sites, a natural depression to one side of the Hondo about twelve
miles west of Roswell. The reservoir and canals, however, were
still incomplete when the company went into receivership, and
the "developments and water rights on the Hondo were transferred, along with the Northern Canal, to Hagerman. 4
/ Work on the Hondo reservoir was never completed under
Hagerman's ownership, and, when the Reclamation Service was
formed under the Newlands Act of 19°2, a group of Roswell promoters asked that the Service build the reservoir. In September
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1902 Frederick H. Newell, first director of the Reclamation Service, visited the site and ordered further investigations. These
were conducted under the direction of Wendell Monroe Heed, a
New York-born civil engineer, who had come to New Mexico in
1889 to work on early irrigation development in the Pecos Valley.
Reed was elected Roswell city engineer in 19°° and held that post
when appointed New Mexico district engineer for the Reclamation Service in 1902. By March of 19°4 the studies had advanced
to the point that the Secretary of the Interior could agree to purchase the eight hundred acres needed for the reservoir from Hagerman at a price Of$20,000.
Almost simultaneously with the announcement of the purchase
authorization, however, Bernard S. Rodey, territorial delegate to
Congress, released the news that gypsum had been found underlying the reservoir site, threatening the status of the project. The
gypsum complication should have been understood by the Roswell
community. A group of homesteaders east of Roswell (circa 1890)
had been thwarted in efforts to use water from the Bottomless
Lakes for irrigation when the bottom of their seven-mile ditch
persisted in disappearing. The gypsum through which the ditch
was bpilt "melted like sugar" when water ran through it. The
ditch was abandoned. 5 More dramatically as Newell pointed out,
the McMillan reservoir was also underlaid with gypsum and beset
with leaks. If the gypsum layer under the Hondo site was not
naturally sealed off from higher layers or could not be sealed
off artificially, the gypsum would dissolve when the reservoir was
filled, and the stored water would seep out underground. The
engineer's report did corttain a promise of hope in the mention that
clay was also present, and that additional borings would be made
to determine whether or not the gypsum beds would necessitate
abandoning the project.
Roswell area residents greeted the announcement of the gypsum
problem with a human, albeit not so rational response. The public,
exuberant with the success of irrigation via the Northern Canal
and artesian wells, and fed by optimistic newspaper stories on the
progress of the Hondo project, was convinced that Roswell would
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have its government-built re§ervoir to add to the booming agricultural economy of the county. Rodey's announcement drew "a
storm of criticism."6 The Rio Hondo Reservoir Water Users' Association, over the signature of its president, John W. Poe, wrote a
letter to Reed inquiring about the possibility of bringing political
pressure to bear in order to assure construction of the project. Reed
replied with assurances that the issue would be decided on its
merits, not by politics, thus reRecting the professional stance
which the Reclamation Service attempted to maintain in its early
years of operation. 7 The exchange foreshadowed the kind of
pressures that would influence reclamation decisions when control
of reclamation funds was taken from the Secretary of the Interior
and placed with Congress under the Reclamation Extension Act
of 19 I 4- The recommendation to go ahead with the Hondo
project was made by a Board of Consulting Engineers. The board,
made up of Reclamation Service engineers, recommended irrigating 10,000 acres (figures as high as 15,000 acres had been previously mentioned), and estimated the cost at $275,000. 8
The Roswell Register, which covered most developments on
the Hondo project in detail, gave no supporting reasons for the
decision to go ahead with the project. It seems probable, however,
that some political considerations did inRuence the decision if only
indirectly. The Reclamation Service, required by the authorizing
act to spend part of its funds in each of the public domain states,
was under constant attack by hostile factions in Congress. To
counter this pressure and maintain its western support, the Service
needed to produce quick results. On both the Pecos and the Rjo
Grande in New Mexico preemptions by private interests were
blocking developments by the Reclamation Service. Of the major
irrigation sites first surveyed by the Service in New Mexico, the
Hondo seemed to offer the least obstacles to immediate development.
'
As plans for the Hondo reservoir had progressed, a group of
prominent Chaves County businessmen had organized the Rio
Hondo Reservoir Water Users' Association in anticipation of the
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project's completion. The articles of incorporation were filed June
20, 19°4. Landowners in the area could buy shares of stock in the
association, each share entitling the holder to water for irrigation of
one acre; The association would contract with the Reclamation
Service to payoff the cost 6f construction over a ten-year period,
as required under the Reclamation Act, and would· administer the
allocation of water from the reservoir. The incorporators and first
directors of the association were among the most active promoters
of upper valley development. Poe, the association's first president,
was a former associate of Pat Garrett, and had been Garrett's successor as sheriff of Lincoln County. He was, in 1904, president of
the Citizens National Bank of Roswell, and had earlier helped establish the Roswell Bank, which became the First National Bank
of Roswell. A Democrat, he was a delegate to the county convention in 19°4. The other incorporators and directors were William
M. Atkinson, A. M. Robertson, G. A. Richardson, E. A. Cahoon,
Samuel Atkinson, Jerry Simpson, L. K. McGaffey, and J. L.
Leonard. Robertson and William Atkinson were Chaves County
commissioners in 19°4, and Atkinson was chairman of the commission.He was also Democratic county central committee chairman. Like Poe, Richardson and Cahoon were among the firs~ directors of the Roswell Bank. Cahoon was chairman of the Republican
central committee in Chaves County, and, along with McGaffey,
was a founder of the Roswell Elks Lodge. McGaffey, a Democrat,
was also a director of the First National Bank of Roswell. As work
on the reservoir progressed, McGaffey began advertising "a choice
holding of Government Reservoir Lands" for sale. 9 "Sockless"
Jerry Simpson, the former Kansas Populist, seemed somewhat out
of place in the group. Simpson, a Roswell real estate man, unsuccessfully sought the Democratic nomination for territorial delegate
to Congress in I 904. He received a sound roasting in the Register,
and was a frequent subject of humorous anecdotes in the paper. lO
Cahoon, Poe, and Samuel Atkinson, along with Hagerman, were
directors of the Pecos Valley and Northeastern Railway Company,
a key piece in the agricultural economy of the county.ll Banking,
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real estate, and other business interests dependent upon growth
were thus well represented on the board of the Water Users'
Association.
In July of 19°4, the same month the Federal government called
for bids on the Hondo construction, the Water Users' Association
published its call for applications for water from the project. Applications covering more than 13,000 acres were received, and, in
November, the association directors approved a contract to pay the
required water tax to the government. The agreement required
payment of the construction cost over a period of ten years, .together with annual maintenance fees. 12
While the Reclamation Service and Water Users' Association
prepared to go ahead with the project, the Pecos Irrigation Company lodged a formal protest against the reservoir construction,
claiming a prior right to the winter Rowand Rood waters of the
Hondo. The Water Users' Association filed a reply, prepared with
Hagern1an's assistance, arguing that the company had sold its
rights to the Hondo waters to Hagerman along with its other
holdings in Chaves County. The dispute was heard before a
three-man board which included Arthur Powell Davis, later
director of the Reclamation Service, and two other Reclamation
Service engineers. The Irrigation Company had 14,000 acres
under irrigation at the time, but claimed the right to water for
54,000 acres. Despite leakage at McMillan reservoir, the company
also claimed the right to have both reservoirs, a combined capacity
of 60,000 acre-feet, filled at all times. The company engineer,
V. 1. Sullivan, agreed, however, that this was wasteful of water.
Additional testimony revealed other inefficiencies in the water-use
practices of the company. Tracy, still company president, indicated that it required 6.9 feet of water to irrigate an acre on
lands served by the company. (He apparently gave the figure from
the point of diversion.) The figure reRects the high loss of water
through seepage from canals. Sullivan also gave amounts of water
used per acre from 19°0-19°3, ranging from a low of 2.55 feet in
1903 to 3.87 feet in 1901, calling the amounts inadequate. Later
Reclamation Service calculations indicate that three acre-feet per
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year should have been optimum on the company's lands. The
settlers using the irrigation company water, however, apparently
were operating on the theory of the more, the better. The tendency
to over-irrigate was familiar to both the Reclamation Service and
Hagerman.
Hagerman took the stand and offered his criticism of the Irriga~
tion Company's practices. Citing his experience on the Northern
Canal, he said thirty inches of water was adequate for most crops.
When excessive water use on the lands served by the canal threatened to ruin the land, Hagerman's company had changed from a
Rat-use rate to a volume charge regulated through a system of careful measurement. The result was a reduction in usage to an
optimum level. Hagerman's practice of scientific agriculture
(coupled with the fortuitous absence of insect pests) had turned
his 50o-acre South Spring ranch orchard into a show piece. Apples
from his orchard were a major feature of the New Mexico exhibit
at the St. Louis World's Fair in 1904.
Both Hagerman's testimony and that of their own officials
seemed to militate against the protesters, and the Irrigation Company dropped its suit following the hearing. I3
On November 30 Davis notified Reed that the Hillsboro,
Texas, finn of Taylor-Moore had won five of the six parts of the
construction contract at a price of just over $102,000. The remaining contract, covering all of the rock excavation, went to Slinkard
Construction Company of Roswell. With work on the project
one-fifth completed, the Taylor-Moore Construction Company
was compelled to give up its part of the construction June 7, 1905.
The company had failed financially on another government contract to build Gunnison Tunnel at Montrose, Colorado, and the
comptroller at Washington had ruled that the company could not
collect payment owed on the Hondo contract while delinquent on
the other. With barely a stop in the work, the Reclamation Service
took up the construction, using the company's equipment. The
project was completed in May 1907. The final construction cost
ran about fifty per cent higher than estimates, a tendency which
has characterized most reclamation work. 14
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Though the Hondo project was completed in time for the 19°7
irrigation season, only about one thousand acres were irrigated
during its first years of operation from 19°7 to 1912. The period
was one of drouth and there was insufficient water to fill the
reservoir. The little run-off which occurred was diverted directly
into the canals for immediate use. When water became available
to fill the reservoir, the concern over the gypsum beds proved to
have been well founded. The reservoir leaked and could not be
completely filled. It is apparently not in lise today.ls
In Chaves County, the main development of irrigation agriculture remained that conducted through private initiative. Individual diversion, community ditches, and the Northern Canal pro~
vided the original impetus. To this was added the discovery of
artesian water underlying the entire upper valley. From 1890 on
artesian water was the main source of irrigation in Chaves County,
bringing in a continual stream of settlers and raising the assessed
valuation of the county to three million dollars, the fourth highest
in the Territory, by the end of 1904- The development of artesian
wells, however, was also marked by poor economy. Uncapped
wells, left to Row whether in use or not, were the rule in the valley.
In 19°4 and 19°5 pleas for control over wells came from Hagerman, Roswell Mayor J. F. Hinkle, and the Reclamation Service,
among others. In 193 I the Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy
District was organized to control the depletion of artesian
aquifers. 16
While the upper valley was still awaiting construction of its
reservoir, the lower valley was hit by the disaster which was to
shift the major thrust of reclamation development in the southeastern part of the Territory. At the end of September 1904 the
flood described above struck, destroying Avalon Dam and damaging the company's other irrigation faCilities. The owners of Pecos
Irrigation Company asked the Reclamation Service to take over
relief work on the dams and canals. A diversion dam was planned
to temporarily replace Avalon Dam in time for the 1905 growing
season, and enough work was completed to allow some crops to be
grown. The Reclamation Service district offices were moved from
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EIPaso to Carlsbad inJanuaryofl9Q5, and negotiations turned
to the possibility of federal' take~overof the project. By th~ end. of
summer a purchase price of $150,000 for the irrigation works,not
including the agricultural land controlled by the Irrigation Company, was agreed upon, and the purchase was completed December 18, 1905}7 ..
' .. By July 1909 repair work on the reservoirs was6.nished, at a
cost of over$65o;000.Many ofthe settlers previously served by
the project, however, had left by the end of. 1907. Only 7,637
acres were irrigated in 1908, a substantial drop from the 14,000
·acres served by the Irrigation Company. The R~clamationService,
less· optimistic than the .private company, proposed irrigating a
·total of about 20,000 acres rather than the 54,000 Which the companyhad intended' to irrigate ultimately. Winter and spring
brought an influx of new settlers, and 12,000 acres were irrigated
in 1909. Settlement was slow thereafter, with new arr'ivals offset
·somewhat by departures, but by' 19 I 2. sixteen thousanq acres were
. under irrigation. Alfalfa, sorghum, and cotton. were the principal
crops, with cotton replacing sorghum in second place in 191 I.
The Reclamation Service was better able to maintain' the irrigation system in operating. condition •than were private investors.
Floods, however, continued to hamper operations, damaging both
. dams again in 191 I. And McMillan reservoir has continued to
leak down to the present. As hadhappenedwith·other reclamation
projects in the early years of the Service, the settlers on the Carls·bad project early' began falling delinquent in their payments. In
191 I ·uncollected charges on the project totalled $106,022. 18 .
By the completion of restoration on theCadsbad pr.oject, the
agricultural patterns of the Pecos Valley in. southeastern New
'. Mexico were fairly wellseLWith the failure of theH9rido project,
. Chaves County'fatmers were forced to rely on artesian water for
irrigation, as' they continue to. do; ,The .artesian belt .extends into
the northern part. of Eddy County. ,The single major agricultural
• .change in Chaves County after 19IO.was the disappearance of the
extensive orchards which6.11ed the. 'valley. The growing problem
of insect pests, added to the frequent late frosts, resulted in re-
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moval of the orchards in the twenties. Experiments with cotton
had already been started in the first decade of the century, and
with the loss of the· orchards, cotton. and alfalfa became the
dominant crops, as in the lower valley.
. In the southern half of Eddy County, the Carlsbad project
remains the primary source of irrigation water. The area under
irrigation has been increased by about five thousand acres. The
project continues to be an expensive one, owing largely to engineering deficiencies in the design and construction of the original
dams. No provisions were made in the design of McMillan for
removal of silt which decreases the reservoir's capacity. Both dams
are still vulnerable to Rood· damage. An effort to correct these
problems was made with the construction of Alamogordo Dam
upstream. Alamogordo Dam was built in 1936-1937 to provide
storage and Rood control for. the project. Two additional dams are
now planned on the Pecos. The Brantley project, between McMillan and Avalon dams, will purportedly compensate for deficiences in McMillan which Alamogordo Dam was designed to
rectify, and Los Esteros Dam will serve the same functions. There
is little in the reclamation history of the valley to support these
claims. The gypsum beds, for example, may still present an obstacle
to successful operation of the Brantley project.
The work of irrigation promoters, and later the Reclamation
Service, clearly spurred the growth of Chaves and Eddy counties,
bringing in thousands of settlers between 1890 and 191o. Whether that growth was beneficial to the area or the nation, however, is
moot. The impetus for growth, if Roswell is representative of both
counties, came,not from the demands of small farmers foe land,
but from bankers, realtors, and other businessmen who actively
sought to bring in settlers for their own financial gain. In Chaves
County, favorable natural conditions rendered the development
relatively smooth. But in Eddy County the effort to promote quick
development without adequate financing or know-how produced a
leaky white elephant. Whether the Reclamation Service relief
operation really served the area is also debatable. Assuming that
a minimal number of applications for water filed for the 19°7
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season was from new- settlers, the farmers on more ,than half of
the acreage· supplied by.the old Irrigation Company had left their
land. Had the company been left on its own, it might well have
failed, causing other settlers to leave the land or make their own
small-scale diversions. Most who .left would have found. opportunities ·elsewhere.· The continual turnover of land ownership
suggests that, as on most 'of the early' Federalreclamation projects,
many of the settlers. on the Carlsbad project were on the land for
speculative purposes anyway. The 'major drive for irrigation land
was exhausted by the time restoration on the Carlsbad project was
completed, as the slow.rate of settlement· indicated. Throughout
the West, the Reclamation Service was compelled to actively seek
settlers for its projects. Perpetuation of the project by the federal
government has led, to development in Eddy County of an economy heavily dependent upon subsidized agriculture. As a result,
it has become nearly impossible ·to avert additional multi-million.
dollar expenditures to bolster an inefficient operation.
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CUTTING VS. CHAyEZ RE-EXAMINED:
A COMMENTARY ON PICKENS' ANALYSIS

T. PffiLLIP WOLF

As

New Mexican, a persistent student of New Mexico polities, and a one-time professor to the author, 1 welcomed the
opportunity to read "Bronson Cutting vs. Dennis Chavez: Battle
of the Patrones in New Mexico, 1934" by William H. Pickens.!
As I examined the article,· my enthusiasm waned in the face of
basic weaknesses in it: seemingly questionable assumptions,
faulty logic, and doubtful assertions. For these reasons, which I
assume may be shared by others or at least of interest to them, I've
written this commentary. It is not an attack on my friend Bill
Pickens but an attempt to clarify key elements in his paper. I
. would expect a similar response from him if our positions were
.
reversed. I welcome his reaction to niycomments.
The main thrust of my positioIi is that Pickens does not effectively refute the several prior commentaries on the 1934 U.S.
Senatorial election in New Mexico. His evidence and argument
in no way seriously undermine those previous explanations which
at critIcal· points are as plausible, and· generally more plausible,
than the new version Pickens offers. With few exceptions I do not
introduce new evidence; Instead I rely on the material presented
in the article. Generally I do not question the data but contest the
inferences made from those data and the assumptions with which
Pickens shapes his presentation.
. There are two implicit factors that structure the article. I) The
motives and strategies of the main contestants: Senator Bronson
Cutting, Congressman Dennis Chavez, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, the Republican Old Guard, and Democratic Party
A FORMER
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leaders. To put it differently, Pickens' research rests on several
.• iniplicitassumptions about the behavior of pOlitical elites. For
example, why did Cutting oppose the Republican Old Guard?
Why did that group resist Cutting? Why did Chavez run against
Cutting rather than oppose Carl Hatch iIi the nominating convention? Why did President Roosevelt endorse Chavez rather
than Cutting? How would Democratic leaders have responded if
Chavez or Roosevelt had reacted differently to the situation? 2)
Pickens also makes assumptions about voters and their behavior.
In this commentary, the most sustained criticism of Pickens'
research is directed at factor I. FaCtor 2-is dealt with briefly. Other
miscellaneous problems are also examined. -

BEHAVIOR OF POLITICAL ELITES

PICKENS persistently confuses the customary with the unusual. In
fact, he reverses those positions, asserting the exception as the
rule and the deviation as the expected. In so doing he displays a
marked naivete about, or at least lack of familiarity with, American politics. (He offers no evidence that New Mexico is an exception to the national pattern on these matters.) There are at
least five instances of this confusion.
First, Pickens is either uninformed about or insensitive to the
ordinary relations between presidents and members of Congress
in electoral situations. He is puzzled by Franklin Roosevelt's en~
dorsement of Chavez. 2 A more understandable cause for perplexity
would have been a Roosevelt endorsement of Cutting. The cus~
tomary pattern is for presidents to endorse members of their party
running for Congress, especially if they are incumbents, or at least
to maintain neutrality. The rare occasions in recent decades when
a president deviated from that pattern were newsworthy precisely
because they were rare. -Roosevelt's attempted purge in 1938 is
probably the rilOSt renowned example. Another case is Richard
Nixon's support for James Buckley of the New York Conservative
Party in 1970. Roosevelt did not repeat the 1938 strategy. Nixon
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cautiously waited until it was clear,. from opinion polls, that the
Republican incumbent Charles Goodell could. not be elected.
Nixon's only choice was between Buckley and the Democrat
Ottinger.. Goodell trailed so badly that a Nixon endorsement
could not have made Goodell competitive. But Nixon could
hope to block Ottinger, who had a liberal record in Congress, and
to appear (to the uninformed) to purge GoodelP Both the 1938
and 1970 presidential attempts to defeat incumbents of their own
party illustrate the unus~al circumstances of that strategy.
Why do presidents customarily either endorse their party's
candidate or remain aloof in congressional elections? That question
leads to the article's second area of naivete about American politics. The main reason that presidents do not endorse opposition
party candidates is that chief executives risk ~uch for little gain
by that action. Congress lacks the rigid party discipline found in
the British House of Commons but party affiliation is nonetheless
the most reliable clue to voting behavior in the United States
Congress. Although one cannot predict individual legislator behavior, it is clearly probable that most Democrats will oppose a
majority of the Republicans on highly contested issues. Over the
last quarter century several studies have reported this pattern!
Presidents may not be aware of the details of these studies but
they do recognize they get more support from members of their
party than from those ofthe opposition. Presidents are also aware
that incumbents have a marked advantage in getting re-elected.
This means that a president cannot critically influence the outcome of most congressio~al elections. Presidents are also sensitive
to the prerogatives of Congress, including the likelihood that many
members of Congress will resent presidential interference to defeat a member. Thus to encourage members of his own party to
vote with the party and to avoid Congressional reprisals, a president ordinarily supports the electoral efforts of his party's candidates. To oppose Dennis Chavez in 1934, Franklin Roosevelt ran
the double risk of engendering his fellow Democrat's opposition
on any action that might transpire before Chavez's House term
expired and the future antagonism of Chavez, whose youth and
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popularity made him a·likely ultimate winner if not in 1934. With
large DemocratiC majorities in both national chambers in 1934,
an endorserrient of Cutting would-likely have raised apprehension
that FDR might attempt
purge sitting members -of Congress.
Wouldn't that be the next step if the President were successful in
blocking the move of a Representative to the Senate? Pickens
properly makes rnuch ofChavez'sJoyalty. To have endorsed Cutting,FDR would have offended a loyal party member (and the
member's following) in order to gainfavor with Cutting whose
political fickleness was well established. 5 Without evidence that
Cutting supported Rooseveltian policies more persistently than
Chavez it is incredible to expect. Roosevelt to have considered
. - _-,
backingCutting.
- - - _.
Thirdly, Pickens errs in regarding ·Chavez's support for John
Garner's 1932. presidential nomination bid as substantial grounds
for· FDRto oppose- Chavez. -Again Pickens misunderstands
American politics. Roosevelt could readily understand that Chavez
would back Garner, a Southwesterner like Chavez, and the most
powerful member of the House, whocOlild provide incomparable
assistance to the freshman congressman. There were _innumerable
ways in which Garner could help Chavez whether the Texan won
the nomination or not. Roosevelt, a skilled practitioner of backscratching and trading off, -could ,- accept these interactions. If
FDR could invite Garner; to be his. vice-presidential mate, he
could certainly forgive Chavez for backing Garner. Similar unlikely unions were made by Stevenson and Kefauver in -1956, Kennedy and Johnson in 1960, and Nixon and Agnew; an early
Rockefeller devotee; in 1968. Of course I'm speaking of the general burying-the-hatchet accommodation. that .follows presidential
nominations: It is possible there was unresolved animosity between Roosevelt and' Chavez, -but Pickens gives no evidence -of
marked hostility after the 1932. convention. Moreover, nothing is
offered to demonstrate that Chavez failed to .support FDR's
election and subsequent administration. On the contrary, wasn't
Chavez's support enthusiastic in both instances?

to
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, , Fourthly,Pich~ns' :statement thitthis' contest "undoubtedly
plagued Roosevelt" ,(po 28) suggests a failure 'to .grasp the priorities of presidential concern. qhlessPickens can produce specific
evidence on this point one can w~ll dis'iniss "it. It is implausible. A
president can hardly.fret over each of the 'more than five. huridn:id
elections, for members~f the' Congressional chambers; especially
one in a small, poor, and relativelyinsignificant state such as New
.Mexico.. Moreover,' as.suJ:TI.ing one:fin'ds Cutting's' campaign
speeches morec9ngenial to the :New Deal than those 6fChavez
, (a view I am not willing to concede except to illustrate thepoirit
at hand); FDHwas sufficiently sophisticated not to be misled by
political rhetoric. The Ptesfdent ~imselfwas frequently criticized
on·, those grounds: he seem:ed :conseI\Tative to the reformers 'and
radical to thest,andpatters. FpR was moved by votes for his
,prog~ains not by~ampaign oratory. As long as that oratory was not
, an attack on the President h.imself,he was l.lIllih~ly to object" to
campaign pleas by Chavez ,llJ?d other'Democrats. 'None 6fthe
excerpts from, Chavez'sspeeches in the article indicate an attack
',' on the President. Thus Piekens erects a straw
One should
,not be surprised that Roosevelt eIidorsed Chavez. :'Rather one is
astonished thai: a scholar would find that unusual and noieworthy.6
,Fjn~lly, Pickens is misdirected in his views about the advantages to Chavez of challenging Senator Cad Hatch I:ither th~m
, Senator Bronson Cutting Cpp: 6~md 26). By Pickens' own accOunt,
Chavez was noted for his loyalty to· the party and', the' party
, regulars. To, have challenged Hitch would have split the DemocratiC Party. After all, Hatch must havehad some support oihe
would not have been appointed Sen:itor (and elected in' 1934).
At the same time, Chavez would have undermined one of his basic
strengths: his record of loyal work for the party and its leaders.
Moreover, if Hatch was a weak cartdidate (as Pickens contends),
to defeat him for the convention nominatIon would hardly enhance Chavez's reputation as a political,leider. In contrast, the
contest with Cutting hadinultiple·advantages. Chavez could have
,the nomination without a struggle. If he defeated Cutting, Chavez

man.
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augmented his political eminence (or "clout" in the current argot)
and weakened his chief rival-for' leadership of the Spanish-speaking'voters. If 'he lost, he 'could run again for major office (he was
not yet forty)' By running in 1934 he established prior claim to
Cutting's seat when it became vacant. Moreover, Chavez added
to his already impressive credentials as a loyal party regular: He
was forsaking a safe House seat to provide the-only formidable
competition to Cutting that his party could offer. The unchallenged leadership of the Spanish-speaking bloc is significant; this
was Dennis Chavez's role for the next three decades. Until his
death Senator Chavez jealously protected his' pre-eminence with
his people, refusing to share that status even with fellow Hispano
leaders. (As Senator Joseph Montoya might well confirm.) On
this point as well, Pickens' revisionist interpretation is less
persuasive than the previous explanations on this point.
To salvage his argument, Pickens must provide documentation
that Roosevelt was "plagued" by his failure to endorse Cutting;
that FDR held a grudge against Chavez for backing Garner in
1932; and that FDR perceived Cutting to be more valuable to
the New Deal than was Chavez. Without such evidence, one
must assume that the actions of Chavez and Roosevelt were predictable. Both responded in amanneI' that was supportive of New
Deal programs and satisfying to Democratic party -leaders. Certainly, FDR was not one to sacrifice'all for party loyalty but he
did know that legislative success depended upon substantial
backing by Congressional Democrats. He did not require Democratic unanimity, but widespread party support was essential. Thu~
he conformed to established political norms and endorsed Chavet.
In turn Chavez, a proven patty man, did not damage the accepted
view of that role by challenging Hatch, a fellow Democrat,for a
Senate seat. Party leaders are especially sensitive to open factionalism, public displays of disunity and disharmony. Evidence of this
is found in every election year, in national and subnational
campaigns. Correctly or not, party leaders believe that voters are
offended by party disunity and that a party must keep its house in
orqer if it is to be successful and not waste its energies. Intense
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nomination contests increase costs in all areas : monetary, personnel, and psychological commitments. Party leaders. do not
place party harmony above ,all other considerations but they 'give
it a high priority. In 1934 Democratic party leaders should have
welcomed Chavez's challenge of Cutting and Roosevelt's endorsement of Chavez.
If Pickens' implicit assumptions about Democratic party leaders
are unconvincing, his discussion of Republican factionalism is
mind-boggling. Every segment of that discussion is weak. For
example, ,Pickens entraps himself in a non sequitur on page 14:
He cites Andrea Parker to the effect that (A) Bronson Cutting
used the Labor Commissioner as an excuse to break with the
Republican Party (or ii~ Old Guard). From that it is concluded
(B) "Such a view insists· that the Old Guard cared little about the
substance of the bill . . . but they wanted Cutting dispatched
to Washington." Thus from Cutting's motives (A} Pickers determines the motives of Cutting's opponents (B). That line 'of
thought is clearly illogical. In fact, the, opposition conclusion
seems as plausible: If, as Parker says; Cutting was using the Labor
Commissioner issue as a strategic device, (and thus "cared little
about" its basic merits), he'would hardly pick an issue on which
the Old Guard was ·indifferent. It seems mOre likely that Cutting
would pick an issue on which the Old Guard would take a.stand
and persist. Why did the Old Guard fight if they were relatively
unconcerned about the issue? Pickens' can hardly maintain that
Cutting saw the substantive issue to be trivial "since Pickens· has
employed that issue to,,;gemonstrate the purity and consistency of
Cutting's progressive ideology. (One difficulty with this first full
paragraph on page 14 is that it is not 'clear that the phrase "Such
a view insists" refers to Parker's position orfic'kens' interpretation
of that position. In any case, it is 'incumbent on Pickens to note
the logical inconsistency and clarify it.)
.
In the next paragraph, Pickens delivers another puzzle when
he refers to the shrewdness of Republicans in averting factionalism prior to 1928. There are, two general defects ,in that contention: That Republicans in prior, years had not been plagued by
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factionalism is not nece~sarilydue to shrewdness. There may not
have been sufficiently controversial issues to split the 'party in its
previous periods of dominance. (That-is,jf one grants a relative
absence of factionalism in the earlier periods.) To put it differently, homogeneity of outlook or interest may have precluded a
schismatic GOP before. Certainly Pickens cites no evidence th~t
demonstrates the shrewdness or even what he means by that tenp.
Moreover the Republican dominance of 1913 .(cited in footnote
33) is not comparable to that of. 1929. Unlike 1928, in 1912
Republicans'lost the White House and did not gain control of the
state house (governor). Thus the 1912 victory was partial, not
complete 'from precinct to White House, as in 1928. On both
points then the argument is weak: No explanation of shrewdness
by Republicans is .presented. : Moreover, with control of the
presidency and governorship, the patronage available after '1928
offered far greater occasions for party divisiveness than in the
aftermath of 1912.
Pickens does stress "legislative history" in making ,his comparison, but a discussion of party factionalism cannot exclude the
impact of the executive branch, especially in New Mexico where
interference from Washington and the governor have often been
critical. Only by restricting his focus to the state legislatmecan
Pickens maintain that the degree of Republican dominanc;e was
as greatin 1913 as in 1929. If that restriction is made, then the
impact of Congress, including Senator, Cutting, would have to be
excluded. Certainly that cannot be done. Contrary to Pickens'
evaluation, there was a greater degree of Republican dominance
in New Mexico after, 1928 than in 1912. Whether this condition
contributed to Republican factionalism cannot be ascertained from
the material Pickens presents, but the increased opportunities for
patronage seem a plausible source of factionalism manifested in
the Cutting-Old Guard squabble.
Pickens moves on to speculate about, the choice of issue on
which Cutting and the Republican Old Guard feU out. Previous
interpretations regard the Labor Commissioner bill as primarily
a power struggle. 7 Pickens contends that several other issues during
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t4eSession, were' equally controversial. Moreover thesematter.s
Were' better arenas for a factional struggle since they did not .involve "ext~n.sive institutional additions or seeming 'class'legislation." Cp: 15) One could as plausibly argue, contrary to Pickens,
tllat these characteristics made the Labor Commissioner question
distinctive and one OIl which the Old'Guard would fight With a
legislative history in which numerous constitutional amendments
havebeenpreseiited to the electorate, the, 1929 ,legislature was
unlikely to be deterred by the bill 'because it required '~extensive
institutional additions." Ceitainlyone can hypothesize that this
consideration made the Labor Commissioner bill an unlikely focus
fot a struggle to control the state Republican party, but the test of
thai hypothesis is imempirical one. Regardless of speculation by
Pickens (or by Wolf) such hypothesizing can only be verified by
the actions taken andaccotints"as to why these actions occurred.
What did first~hand observers of the situation have to say? Not
only about the Labor Commissioner bill but the viability of the
several other issues as alternative contexts for a party power struggle? By their own accounts 'how did the Old Guard perceive the
controversy? Pickens doesn'ttell tis but surely there must be some
, material that would indicate the motives of the contestants. Once
again, Pickens has not marshalled the data to confirm his specula, tion. (What I have ci.-iticized here does not resolve the matter of
motives behind the Labor Commissioner bill struggle. It does
show that Pickens has'not satisfactorily clarified the matter.) ,
PERCEPTIONS OF AND BY THE PUBLIC

PICKENS' firial thrust on the Labor Commissioner battle explores
the· reasons that Spanish-surnamed'legislators gave overwhelming
backing for this legislatjon. Since their constituents were primarily
rural and agrarian why would they endorse this legislation which
would be of little immediate benefit to their electors? Pickens
decides they supported 'the bill because they saw it to be a step
toward a programmatic approacp to help all lower income groups,
Spanish-speaking 'and Anglo. "How else can the solid Spanish-
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speaking' vote in the legislature .; . be explained?" (p. 15)
Once more Pickens offers speculation but no evidence to connrm
that-Yet an alternative interpretation can be supported by Pickens'
paper: Cutting was highly popular with Spanish-American voters
and their political representatives. On page 1 I, Pickens eloquently
attests this relationship:, Spanish-Americans "adored'" Cutting,
who "employed" them,' "fought for their candidates, and conversed in their tongue." (And. it might be added, loaned them
money. Weren't stacks of promissory notes, cancellable upon his
death, found in Cutting's papers?) This affinity to Cutting combined with the tradition ofpatrones in Spanish-speaking precincts
is a straightforward explanation of the Spanish-American legislative bloc's votes for the Labor Commissioner bill. Cutting wanted
the bill. He was popular with the Spanish-American legislators
and.their constituents~ Therefore the legislators voted for the bill.
Moreover this explanation is parsimonious and· consistent with
the evidence Pickens himself uses. Because of its evidential basis
one must prefer this explanation to Pickens' programmatic or
ideological one unless and until evidence is uncovered that indicates these legislators perceived the issue in the programmatic
manner Pickens suggests. The patronal explanation' I present
would also be weakened if it could be demonstrated that on other
legislation sponsored. by Cutting the. Spanish-American legislative
bloc did not persistently follow his lead. Again Pickens fails the
empirical test and in this instance a more plaUSible explanation is
buttressed by other information in the paper.
The argument is not only weak in explaining support for the
Labor Commissioner bill; the interpretation of the sources of opposition is also dubious. On page 14 Pickens asserts that Republicans feared to express sympathy for labor because that would "lose
them (Republicans) the votes of wealthy New Mexicans." Even
in 1928-1934, there were more votes from labor than from wealthy
.New Mexicans. What the GOP stood. to lose was not votes but
money; campaign funds which labor could not match. It may have
been (or at least presumed) that the Republican forces could not
prevail.without large contributions. which ultimately would be
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translatable into votes.. Nonetheless the .critical asset of wealthy
New Mexicans was not their numbers but the amount of campaign funds they could generate: There have never been many
wealthy New Mexicans iIi proportion to .thestate's population.
Another role of the wealthy is that of opinion leadership. They
may serve as reference points from which other .citizens get clues
for their own preferences. on policies and .candidates. Thus the
wealthy as opinion leaders, indirectly influence many votes.
Whether wealthy New Mexicans are conceptualized-as a source
of campaign funds or as a pool of opinion leaders, it is not their
votes that are their crucial asset in a campaign calculus,. it is their
potential (money.and opinion leadership)for influencing other
voters,S
In examining support and opposition to the Labor Commissioner
bill, Pickens implies that both the Spanish-American legislative
bloc and the Republican Old Guard were oriented primarily:toward the electorate, either their specific constituents (the SpanlshAmericans) or a more general segment of the public (wealthy
New Mexicans). It is unlikely that the influences 'on legislators
are unidimensional. Probably the personal ideological preferences
of the legislators as well as interest-group pressures and poli~ical
leadership also were factors in this legislative decision. This is. a
minor criticism but deserves .mention in emphasizing the complexity of legislative decision making. The tradition of legislative
politics in New Mexico, if.one is to believe the press, is one in
which interest groups have a prominent role. Pickens notes the
endorsements of organized labor in the 1934 U.S.' Senatorial
campaign (p. 34, fn. 60) but does indicate the impact of pressure
groups in the legislature. Here it appears Pickens could have
strengthened his case by stressing Cutting's leadership which
linked together constituency (at least for Spanish-American legislators) and interest-group (labor) factors.
Perhaps the most egregious. assertion Pickens makes is in his
conclusion: "Yet the public perceived no erratic experimenter in
Cutting. Rather they saw a. man of consistent vision who had
finally Come into·his own." (p. 29) If there is a sweeping assertion
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inthepaper it is this. Yet this statement~eems to be the least
defensible evaluation in the article. Apparently, Pickens reaches
his conclusion. about the public's view of Cutting from the 1934
election results. Numerous studies of voting behavior demonstrate
that election results alone rarely give direct' clues as to why
citizens voted as they dId, or-how they perceive candidates. Thus
public _opinion studies in the 1950'S showed the public (at least
,its majority) was persistently incorrect and uninfoiined about
President Eisenhower's stands on issues. (And about Governor
Stevenson's views as welL) Moreover, they apparently were unconcerned that they lacked or misperceived this infor:mation.
Similarly,. in 1968 when Senator Eugene McCarthy challenged
President Johnson, more voters than not misperceived McCarthy's
views on Vietnam. Yetthis issue was the heart of the Senator's
campaign. 9
If one were to concede for· the sake of argument that the
electorate did correctly perceive and react to Cutting's ideology,
the assertion that Pickens makes would· still he questionable. Since
the election was ch)se, unless this ideological mattetwas the only
determinant of the election it would be unwise to characterize the
. publi~ as Pickens does.It se~msreasonablethatChavez voters did
not support him ,because they 'found Cutting's ideology compelling~ Moreover some votes for Cutfing were cast despite his
ideology but because he was a Repub.Jican. The electoral calculus
runs along these lines: Nearly half the voters went for Chavez
and thus were not moved by Cutting's poliCies; some voters supported Cutting because, he was a Republican/o others responded
fayorablytohispersonal qualities as distinCt from his policy stands.
. The remainder, most certainly a minority of the public; might have
been moved by his Ideological appeal. Thus if Cutting's ideology
was correctly understood it probably influenced less than a majority of the electorate. That harqly peimits oIle to refer to the
public's viewof Cutting's "consistentvision." .
.
... If Pickens does not base ihis assertion on the election outcome,
it must be on some other evidence 6f the 'electorate's perception of
Cutting. Such other evidence is not offered in support of the as-
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sertion. In those days before the extensive use of opinion surveys
it would be difficult to compile information representative of the
New Mexico electorate's opinions and preferences. Certainly
newspaper editorials and commentary cannot be used as valid
manifestations of the public's views.

MISCELLANEOUS

As A FOLLOWUP to this discussion of ideology, Pickens' unusual
assessment of the general political philosophies of the 1934 contestants deserves comment. The article both underplays Chavez's
political philosophy and seemingly exaggerates Cutting's or at
least its significance. On page 28 we find, "Chavez had no real
philosophy of government; he was a man who liked popular projects. Time
after time he stressed that he would back what the
I
.
people wanted." Isn't the latter a philosophy of government? If
not a philosophy of government, what would one call being sensitive to the wishes of constituents and reacting positively (responsibly) to those wishes? Isn't that essentially what the young
adult protests in recent years, particularly opposing U.S. policy
in Southeast Asia, were about, i.e., making government more
responsive to popular will? Wasn't it a tenet of Populism that
government should not be dominated by aristocrats and the afHu-.
ent (or socioeconomic elites, as social scientists say today) but it
should yield to public demand? Perhaps Populism was a grab bag
of principles, some of which were incompatible with each other,
but it was none the less a philosophy of governing. Pickens' characterization of Chavez resurrects an enduring controversy of
politics: Should elected officials primarily reRect the views of their
constituents or should they exercise their own judgment even if
that is contrary to :their constituents' desires? That controversy is
eloquently presented in Edmund Burke's famous speech to the
electors of Bristol. It persists today in the conceptualization by
political scientists that legislators perform either "trustee" or
"delegate" roles or a mixture of the two.
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This dismissal (or nonrecognition) of the Populist or delegate.
basis of Chavez's political philosophy leads Pickens to at least one
error of logic. It may be that statements lauding the constitution
and the will of the people make superficial campaigns, but to assert
that "such statements indicated he (Chavez) held the opinions of
the Old Barons about public authority" (p. 18) is a non sequitur.
It may be that those persons imbued Chavez with the tools and
wisdom of his political trade, but defense of the constitution and
popular sovereignty in no way make Chavez distinctive. Can we
cite any American politician who would deny these principles? I
doubt it. Moreover the espousal of these values is consistent with
a Populist philosophy and the "practical values" of fighting for
jobs and benefits that are recounted on page 19. As Pickens notes,
the upshot of these efforts may have been to stress New Mexico's
interests rather than a national perspective. But that emphasis is a
defensible, even acceptable, view of representation. That Pickens
(and Wolf) might disagree with this view makes it no less an
acceptable philosophy of government. The desirability of a regional versus a national perspective is another durable issue of political
representation. l l If a representative does not promote the interests
of his constituents who will? All elected officials have some responsibility for the nation as a whole but their primary representative function must be for the voters in their district.
Another theme to which Pickens refers is patronage politics,
including nepotism. (fn. 63, p. 35.) Although it may not be
consonant with contemporary middle-class values it is certainly a
philosophy of government. The philosophy and practice of rewarding friends and family while denying aid to one's opponents
has a long history in American politics. It is symbolized by the
political boss, a distinctive American contribution to the political
institutions of democracy. It is certainly consistent with the folklore and implicit philosophy of much New Mexico politics, as well
as the career of President Andrew Jackson, to mention only one
example from the broader spectrum of our political heritage.
The thrust of these comments is not to defend the political
philosophy of Dennis Chavez but to note that the charge he lacked
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one is not supported by the evidence and argument in the article.
Espousal of the Constitution and constituents' interests, as well
as emphasis on local matters over national issues are valid elements
of a political philosophy.12 Patronage politics are also compatible
with a particular political philosophy. It is one which many of
us reject but a philosophy none the less.
The contention that Cutting had a political philosophy, moreover a consistent one, rests largely on the exploration of one issue:
the labor commissioner proposal. To be sure, other issues are .
mentioned: a veterans' bureau Cp. 8), tariff, conservation, and
state ownership of public lands Cp. 9), deficit spending and public
works Cp. 20), organized lcibor Cp. 22), and federal aid to education Cfn. 69), but one could hardly term these a consistent
political philosophy"since they are insufficiently examined. More
directly, one can admit that Cutting had a political philosophy,
but the details of that and its internal consistency, as well as continuity over time, are not adequately elaborated. This article does
not demonstrate the conclusion that Cutting's political appeal was
primarily ideological. On the contrary, this paper, as well as the
general aura about Cutting, indicates his appeal was a mixture of
ideology, personal leadership, and patronage, but mainly a distinctive New Mexico version of friends-and-neighbors politicking
that was based substantially on Spanish-speaking supporters.
Did Cutting come to be "a national figure to be reckoned with"
as Pickens asserts? Cp. 29) That is doubtful. Certainly he was a
national figure in that he was a member of the national legislature,
but presumably that is not what Pickens means. Instead some
national status with considerable recognition is a reasonable
interpretation. A simple test of Cutting's. national stature is the
coverage of his activities by the national news media. For example,
the Index to the New York Times for 1934 lists less than a dozen
references to Cutting. A few more are found in the 1935 Index,
as well as those under "New Mexico," part of which are crosslistings from the "Cutting" entry. The most mentioned topic for
both years is the challenge by Chavez to the outcome of the 1934
election. CAh, New Mexico politics where charges of election
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trickery never cease!) If Cutting were the "national figure to be
reckoned with," some indication of that status should have been
pronounced at his death. Although a lengthy Times obituary was
published no particular national significance was attributed to
Cutting. At the time of his death, Cutting was mentioned in a
Times editorial (May 8, 1935), but that statement stressed the
healthful benefits of the American Southwest, not Cutting's national prominence. Certainly in comparison with another U.S.
Senator from another minor state, Huey Long, Cutting was hardly
a nationalpower. Here, as in the case of FDR's presumed concern
about the 1934 election contest, Pickens has substantially exaggerated the attention and importance attached to New Mexico
politics by the nation as a whole. New Mexico politics are colorful and fascinating but ordinarily of only modest concern beyond
the state's borders.
CONCLUSION

PROBABLY the most insightful observation in the paper is on page
12, where Pickens analyzes the appeal of Cutting for Spanishspeaking voters. Among Anglo politicians, only David F. Cargo,
governor in the 1960's, had a comparable appeal. That Cutting
did not pose a threat to their leaders and that he did not compete
with those leaders for status within the Spanish-speaking community is an intriguing explanation of his success. The tables of
election results on page 24 demonstrate Cutting's drawing power
against Chavez in the Spanish precincts. The vote in these areas
with its conversion from Republican to Democratic sympathies
from the mid-twenties to Roosevelt's second term is a topic that a
future study might illuminate. That transformation may also hold
the clue to the sustained high voter turnout from 1932 to 1934.
The typical fall-off of votes in nonpresidential years did not occur
in 1934. 13 Why?
Much of the foregoing has been negative, but that is the nature
of a critique. No claim is made that definitive answers have been
found for the weaknesses detected in the paper. Instead these
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Raws have been noted with suggestions as to how they might be
reconciled. One might equate this critique with the report of a
building inspector who finds nails missing in the walls of a house.
If the house (Pickens' article) is to stand, it must have sufficient
nails driven into the studding so the structure won't collapse at
the first strong wind. Pickens needs to nail more firmly parts of
his argument.
.
Basically, this critique raises three general, sequential questions: First, what are the understandable expectations that should
apply to a situation, i.e., on the basis of what is already known
about a set of relations, such as Presidential-Congressional interaction? Second, are there grounds to anticipate that the situation
at hand would be different than the general situation, e.g., that
Roosevelt would endorse the opposition candidate, Cutting?
Third, what evidence is available to confirm or deny the speculation that this specific sItuation is an exception? This sequence of
questions-what should we expect? should we expect this situation
to be an exception to the general pattern? and what evidence supports the interpretation that this is an exception?-are applicable
to most of the criticisms made. The Pickens article is an excellent
illustration of the complexities of answering these questions.
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NOTES

I. NMHR, vol. 46 (1971), pp. 4-36.
2. Pickens characterizes Chavez as "more conservative" in this passage (pp. 6-7) but offers little evidence to support that evaluation. How
did Chavez's record compare with that of other members of Congress in
1933-34? Was he left or right of center? Left or right of Cutting? Fundamentally, the defect here is that Pickens does not specify what is meant
by conservative. At the very least, it is necessary to distinguish between
economic and civil liberties dimensions of conservatism. Apparently,
Pickens concentrates on the former. Pickens seems to classify Chavez on
the basis of his public statements. On that evidence, FDR in 1932 would
be conservative. Granted that public statements could be used to determine
ideological stance, Pickens fails to marshal persuasive evidence. It seems
highly questionable to rate Chavez more conservative than Cutting. These
misperceptions are frequently made, e.g., the comparison of T. E. (Gene)
Lusk with David F. Cargo in the 1966 New Mexico gubernatorial election.
3. Another Goodell disadvantage was that he had not been elected to
the Senate. As a replacement for Robert F. Kennedy, he was seeking to
hold the seat in his own right. Appointees to Senate vacancies have been
notably unsuccessful electorally in recent years, e.g., Edwin Mechem of
New Mexico in 1964.
4. The best known is Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore, 1951, rev. ed. 1970).
5. It is true that presidents may remain neutral when party considerations dictate a partisan posture. Thus Democratic presidents in recent
years have failed to endorse opponents of leading Republicans, e.g., the
late Everett M. Dirksen when he was Senate Minority Leader. But the
Democratic presidents did not endorse Dirksen. Cutting's Senate role in
1934 was not as important as Dirksen's in the 1950's and 1960's.
6. If this line of thought is sound, the statement "It was years after
Bronson Cutting's death before reasonable speculation appeared concerning
Roosevelt's reason for endorsing the more conservative Chavez. . . ." (p. 6)
is superfluous.
7. The phrasing "political and not economic" (p. 15) is misleading. All
the issues mentioned in that paragraph are political as are most that confront legislators. It seems preferable to characterize the situation as one
about "power (or party control) not ideology."
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8. Perhaps one could dismiss this use of "votes" for "money" or "opinion leadership" as literary license. In that event little critical comment is in
order. That view seems uncharitable to the author and NMHR who offer
the study as a serious piece of scholarship.
9. Several reports of this anomaly appeared in the aftermath of the
1968 New Hampshire presidential primary. A summary of the situation
is found in Milton Rosenberg, Sidney Verba, and Philip Converse, Vietnam and the Silent Majority: A Dove's Guide (New York, 1970), pp.
48-5°'
10. This partisan identification should have been more important in
1934 than today when, we are told, voters have become more independent
and less partisan. Of course, Pickens could choose to argue that New
Mexicans in 1934 were an exception to the partisan tendencies of the
period. What grounds would he use for that contention?
11. That this emphasis on state issues "did little to enhance his
(Chavez's) stature in the House of Representatives" is questionable. The
thrust of a Congressman's ideological views is probably irrelevant to his
stature in the House. That stature seems to be determined by the wisdom,
patience, and expertise a member demonstrates. For example, in the late
1950'S (Judge) Howard Smith (D-Va.) as House Rules Committee Chairman and Charles Halleck (R-Ind.) as House Minority Leader had impressive stature in the House. They were also defenders of their districts'
interests as are most Congressmen if they wish to be re-elected. In contrast, John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon never achieved any notable
stature within the chambers during their service in the two houses of
Congress. Of course, they attained national prominence in those capacities.
It is ,perhaps that" a national reputation, not stature in the house that
Pickensintends.
12. That Chavez was not always consistent in his pronouncements
and actions (fn. 71, p. 35) does not invalidate the contention that he had
a political philosophy. Each of us, especially politicians, has to choose
among imperfect alternatives. To cut taxes benefits constituents by
lowering the costs of government. But emergency appropriations may be
necessary to create jobs, which may also benefit one's constitu~nts. To
point this out is not to suggest that no criticism of Chavez can be made on
these grounds. No doubt, valid criticism can be made but this example is
not persuasive as it is presented.
13. 15°,000 votes were cast in the gubernatorial contests in both
years. The congressional race drew 148,000 votes each time, but the Cuting-Chavez contest attracted 151,000 votes. The 3,000 vote difference
between Chavez's 1932 and 1934 races is about the increase in the Spanish-
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speaking counties (p. 24). Increases and declines for the rest of the state
seem to cancel out each other. Why was Cutting so markedly popular in
San Miguel and Valencia counties? Note the anti-Spanish sumamevote
associated with the East Side (or Little Texas) counties is less noticeable
in 1934 than it is now. Or is it? This commentary on the election results is
not a criticism of Pickens' article. It merely suggests a theme that other
scholars may wish to follow in building upon Pickens' research.
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CUTTING VS. CHAVEZ:
A REPLY TO WOLF'S COMMENTS

WILLIAM H. PICKIlNS

I

AM GLAD my article "Bronson Cutting vs. Dennis Chavez: Battle
of the Patrones in New Mexico, 1934" (NMHR, vol. 46, 1971,
pp. 5-36) has provoked some controversy. Both "patrones" deserve
further comment if only for their domination of New Mexico
politics for thirty-five years. I also appreciate the time and effort
Professor Wolf has invested in his critique. I believe our debate
contains some fundamental disagreements about the best way to
apprQach the 1934 election as an historical event. Such disagreements have a broader importance than merely the Cutting-Chavez
story since they involve assumptions that guide historical research
from the beginning.
Perhaps the scope of the original article was too broad and general for such a relatively brief study; I concede that more evidence
is needed to clarify certain assertions. But, in accusing me of going
further than the evidence permits, Wolf overstates his own criticisms. My defense rests on two points.
First, Wolf ignores the stated purpose of the article. Beyond
the drama of the election, I sought "to illuminate the larger outlines of the New Deal in New Mexico and ways that depression
was shaping political consciousness" (p. 7).1 The research of
many scholars has produced substantial accounts of the political
lives of Cutting and Chavez and in particular of this election (pp.
6 and 30). I tried to summarize this research and offer broad interpretations from the summaries. So it is neither appropriate nor
accurate to use (as Wolf does) only the information in the article
for judgment. He criticizes my Jack of elaboration on several
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points. My answer is that he will find the details he demands in
such recent scholarship as Richard Beaupre's master's essay and
Gustav Seligmann's dissertation on Cutting's life, both of which
shaped my overview. It is regrettable that Seligmann's work has
not been published, and indeed that University presses have
given us no comprehensive work focussing on this period of New
Mexico's history.2
Within the space of twenty-five pages, then, my problem was to
identify the major historiographical issues and draw some conclusions without choking the article with clots of quotations or massive footnotes. If I might extend Wolf's parting analogy, I drove
few nails into the "historical" house because (I) the number of
nails I could use was limited; (2) many different-sized nails,
driven by others, had secured parts of the house before I arrived;
(3) my nails were meant for strategic points to hold the frame
together. The building inspector finds few nails driven by the
contractor because the walls, ceiling, and floor were well prefabricated.
Second, Professor Wolf's comments informed by political theory
are most perceptive. But he lacks familiarity with the actual events
of the national New Deal, recent historical judgments about its
course, and Cutting's place among Republicans in the U.S.
Senate. He is led to conclusions about the Thirties and Cutting's
national role which, regardless of how well they apply to most
theoretical situations, clearly distort this period in American history. Wolf makes much over my confusion of "the customary with
the unusual" and speaks often of rules,exceptions, deviations, and
patterns. My goal was more modest than the one he demands; I
wished to describe the reactions of two men to an urgent crisis (the
Great Depression) without regard to other crises or other men.
Generalizations about "the behavior of political elites," "general
situations," etc. in this particular case are largely unenlightening.
We should rather be concerned with speCifically what happened,
how it happened, and tentative conclusions about why it happened. I do not claim that New Mexico was unique or exceptional,
the pattern or the deviation. That is for others to decide. I merely
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attempted to summarize the findings of scholars and offer further
explanations based on their research and my own into the source
materials.
Two alternative responses to Professor Wolf's criticisms are
possible. I could attempt a point-by-point discussion of his questions and challenges, using additional information in narrow explanations and shaping it to meet his specific objections. This
strikes me as somewhat pedantic and of interest to a very small
number of readers. I have therefore decided to address my comments to Wolf's major criticisms while attempting to cover most
of his detailed suggestions at least by implication. Using this approach, lean provide more elaboration on the issues of substantial
importance in the Cutting-Chavez fight, the prime goal of the
original article. Perhaps Wolf and I can find some common ground
after all.
THE LABOR COMMISSIONER FIGHT AND THE GOP

OUR FIRST ARGUMENT comes over the Republican split of 1929.
Wolf suggests that I have cited "no evidence that demonstrates
the shrewdness" of Republican leaders in that year. Surely their
overwhelming victory in 1928 made possible by the coalition of
Springer, Dillon, and Cutting is "evidence" enough Cp. 9). National prosperity did not insure a triumph in New Mexico; a Republican split had lost the Governorship and a Senate seat during
the Coolidge sweep OLI924. Serious doubt existed that the three
wings of the GOP, especially the one dominated by the rebellious
Cutting, could work together in 1928. I quoted Hervey's doubts
on page 8. ''I'm absolutely independent," Cutting had said then,
''I'm almost fifty-fifty as far as the major parties are concerned."3
The Old Guard distrusted him to an extreme. "God forbid!" wrote
H. B. Hensley to Holm Bursum in August, "that the Republican
party should make the grievous mistake of sending [Cutting] to
the U.S. Senate . . . whose highest ambition seems to be never
to miss an opportunity to knife the Republican party."4

340

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW XLVII:4 1972

In spite of this tension, Springer, Dillon, and Cutting did cooperate and so contributed their respective blocs (p. 9) to the
greatest victory in state history to that date. The compromises that
allowed this, unity resulted from shrewd trade-offs, the most significant being the Old Guard's (i.e. Springer's) acceptance of a
labor commissioner in the party's platform (p. 13) It is doubtful,
though little concrete evidence exists, that Springer's Republicans
thought Cutting would seriously push the commissioner idea. As
we know, he did-making it the major fight during the legislative
session. For reasons outlined on page 13, the Old Guard could not
accept the commissioner bill especially since its original form contained such absurdities as promotion of workers' organizations. On
February 13, 1929, Cutting's New Mexican declared that anticommissioner Republicans had repudiated the laboring man.
Charges followed that "the Republican Old Guard is keeping the
lower class in a state of serfdom."5 A battle began within the
GOP that lasted for twenty years.
In this regard, the article's point was that, though any faction
within a party desires dominance over the party's organization, the
central conflict in 1929 was ideological. Through Cutting and his
allies, Spanish-Americans along the Rio Grande and lower-class
Anglos along the Texas border and in the mines of New Mexico
began to demand a government that would actively meet their
needs. Wolf suggests that the commissioner fight was primarily
for party control and patronage. Surely these are ever-important
in American politics, but I think substantial evidence exists that
ideology was equally important. The commissioner fight involved
a struggle for ideological dominance of the Republican party in
New Mexico.6
I shall not elaborate much on the arguments between the
"Barons" and Cutting's "government expansionists" that appear
in the article, except to suggest that a reading of the New Mexican, the Albuquerque Journal, the New Mexico State Tribune,
and the Las Vegas Optic (the spectrum of editorial opinion)
during the legislative debates reveal arguments of a distinctly
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ideological hue. Time and again appear charges of "class legisla~
tion," "unfair government intervention," "the lower. class," and
"the natural course of the economy," phrases which had rarely
cropped up during Dillon's first term. 7 Such rhetoric may mask
personal power struggles, but in this case two further factors
persuade me to the contrary. I reiterate the contention that this
was a serious debate over which groups within the state should be
assisted by the government.
First, according to Gustav Seligmann, during this time Cutting
began to lose support from those upper- and middle-class "respectable people," mostly old Progressives, who disliked appeals to
class interest. During the commissioner fight and more so as the
Depression crept over America, Cutting openly suggested "fundamental reforms in the body politic" that might aid the lower
classes. We shall explore these reforms in later paragraphs; the
point is that in public office Cutting renewed a sense of commitment to an egalitarian philosophy he urged during the ProgressiveEra. "He went to the Senate in [late] 1927," Arthur Schlesinger Jr. writes, "and quickly won a place as a hard working and
courageous radical. . . . He conveyed in Washington a genuine
sense of aristocratic high principle, which he mingled somewhat
strangely with the tough political machine he maintained in New
Mexico."8
Schlesinger's comments have a balance (high principle and
tough political machine) that well reRect the two thrusts of Cutting's position on the labor commissioner. This leads to the
second reason for my conclusion that ideology played a strong
role in the commissioner battle. In spite of Cutting's "tough
machine," it is impossible to believe that in 1929 Cutting could
have gaineq control over the party's patronage or political machinery regardless of the commissioner controversy. Clearly Dillon.was
on the Old Guard's side. Aftet learning of Springer's adamant
opposition, the ,Governor disavowed his support for the bill. Bitter
words passed between Cutting and Dillon upon several occasions.
An embarrassed Dillon later blamed Cutting for the mistakes that
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forced a special session of the Legislature to untangle knots
caused by "the crowding and confusion during the last days of the
[regular] session."9
Likewise, the Old Guard could hardly have believed that the
national Administration would smile on Cutting. He was notorious for political irregularity. By 1929 he had switched parties
four times. One story circulated, according to Erna Fergusson,
that "when Senator Cutting presented himself in the U .S.Senate, [the Sargeant-at-Arms] asked on which side of the chamber
he wished to be seated: was he a Democrat or a Republican?"
Indeed, by 1930 the New Mexican Senator had lost what patronage he gained by his support of Hoover in 1928.10
It is therefore difficult to believe that the Old Guard feared
Cutting's control over party machinery in 1929 if his only resource
had been his money and maneuvers in the capitol's cloakrooms.
Cutting's "tough machine" operated best outside the confines of
formal party structures. l l On the other hand, his ideological appeal
for a coalition based on lower-class support was a threat not only
to Old Guard domination of the Republican party but also to
their power in New Mexico politics. This ideological struggle
became even clearer during the desperate years after the commissioner fight.
c

THE ISSUE OF A PHILOSOPHY OF GOVERNMENT

PROFESSOR WOLF ignores both my intention in discussing the
views of Cutting and Chavez about government and the historical
context for these views. I intended no disquisition on "general
political philosophies," delegate theories, etc., such as Wolf provides. Rather, my goal was to define "ways that depression was
shaping political consciousness" (p. 7). Throughout the article
appears the theme of the economic responsibilities of government:
the labor commissioner battle, "state government . . . protecting
their property and employing about a thousand [party members],"
"rhetoric tailored to the economic crisis," "government had to
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have powers to strike directly at evils produced by an industrial
society" (pp. 19, 22, 25).
Even the hastiest overview of the Hoover years indicates that
debates increasingly centered on the wisdom of Federal intervention in the economy and on national relief. The sort of discussion
that Wolf provides for several pages literally became academic as
the American economy hit bottom in 1932-33. Rarely have the
fundamental responsibilities of our government been scrutinized
with such passion and solutions thrust forward with such vigor.
Swept into this debate were traditions and totems· of American
life whose enduring wisdom had been questioned earlier by only
the most profane. In this regard, I cannot resist one challenge:
"defense of the constitution and popular sovereignty in no way
make Chavez distinctive. Can we cite any American politician
who would deny these principles? I doubt it," says Wolf. "The
doctrine of the infallibility of the Holy American Constitution
was decidedly sour," said Cutting, ". . . [We should] pitch .. :
a lot of that ancient and venerable document into the trash
can. . . . It could well be rewritten." Comparing Depression to
war, Al Smith asked in 1933, "And what does a democracy do in
war? It becomes a tyrant, a despot, a real monarch." "Give the
President for a year the widest and fullest powers," suggested
Walter Lippman a few days later. I2
My point about the Cutting-Chavez differences is illustrated by
their actions in Congress. During the crisis the question of government leadership (and leadership within the government itself)
became acute. It was no longer enough to rely, as Dennis Chavez
said he did, on "the will of the people" (p. 18) and vague notions
of popular sovereignty. Americans and New Mexicans literally
had no "will" if that term implies a consensus about measures
against Depression. From a thousand respected voices came com~
plaints, threats, suggestions, panaceas. In the face of this, several
scholars have noted that the dominant mood in America was not
anger, not revolutionary zeal, not determination for real change,
so much as a confusion of hopelessness. I3

~44

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW XLVII:4 ·1972

Forcefully and continuously, Cutting led or supported attempts
by "Republicans of the left wing" (Hoover's phrase) to employ
the resources of the Federal government for massive public works,
relief, and economic reform. Before the New Deal, Cutting introduced a five-billion-dollar works bill, helped organize Senators
behind the LaFollette-Costigan relief measure, authored legislation· providing assistance for transients, strongly opposed cuts in
government salaries and budget balancing, and "assailed
[Hoover's] relief program as a 'wavering policy which left the
country facing the alternatives of starvation or revolt.' " During the
Roosevelt years, Cutting broadened his concerns, introducing
measures to nationalize credit, provide wider coverage for the
elderly than the Administration proposed, organize consumer
groups, grant relief to striking workers, and assist\ the nation's
schools with Federal funds. By 1933 Cutting had become the
Senate's leading spokesmanfor veterans' benefits. He consistently
stressed the "fundamental need for national planning to equate
consumption with production." Cutting's leadership prompted
a writer for the New Republic to conclude that he had "perhaps
the greatest understanding of the modern trend in government."
"His radicalism may be no deeper than that of Norris or 'Young
Bob' LaFollette," wrote Frederick Barkley i~ Sons of the Wild
Jackass, "but it is broader and more encompassing."14
In contrast, although Dennis Chavez did riot vote solidly with
the "conservative" Democrats (he opposed their national sales tax,
veterans' cuts, and the Roosevelt Economy bill), he never assumed leadership on any major measure nor was his record
consistent in regard to government expansion. Mainly, Cutting
and Chavez disagreed about the need for national, coordinated
efforts against the Depression as opposed to local measures (a
point made in the article). One may question Cutting's solutions
for the Great Depression (this seems the trend now in New Deal
historiography).15 Nevertheless, it is clear that Cutting and the
other Progressives assumed leadership long before the advent of
Roosevelt and offered a viable program for economic. reform and
government responsibility for unemployment. As Hofstadter tells
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us Cp. 29), they were not better equipped than conservatives to
understand the paradoxes of the Great Crash in 1929. But they
were, according to Seligmann, "ideologically prepared to extend
the scope of government when no other means could succeed."
This was the major political issue during the height of the economic crisis. "Reform in the 1930'S," William Leuchtenberg
writes, "meant economic reform."16 On one side" of this debate,
Bronson Cutting took a forceful and consistent stand.
CUTTING AS A NATIONAL FIGURE
AND HIS IMAGE WITH NEW MEXICANS

PROFESSOR WOLF is correct to emphasize the difficulty in establishing voter motivation with any precision. Certainly Cutting
made effective use of his money, his political ties, and his newspapers Cpp. 7-8, 26). Certainly the 1934 Senate vote was dramatically close. In view of growing Democratic majorities, the popularity of Dennis Chavez, and the opposition of the powerful FDR,
the surprising element is that Cutting won at all. My contention
is not that Cutting's ideology was the only factor in the election,
but rather that it was a major factor in dividing the voters both
for and against the Republican.
Professor Wolf's most misinformed assertion is that Cutting
was not a national figure. Although I respect the N ew York
Times, we should not let it be the definitive source of a man's
reputation, as Wolf does. Cutting's major fights in Congress-for
Philippine independence, for veterans' assistance, against the
Smoot Anti-obscenity proposal-were given wide coverage and
especially endeared him to liberal intelligentsia. "Cutting is the
Senate's leading liberal," announced aNew York newsman after
the obscenity fight, "the Senate's most astonishing man." "He is
today one of the most intelligent and clearthinking of the insurgents," Drew Pearson concluded. "That he" is himself the most
intelligent and cultured man in the Progressive group," Owen
White wrote in American Mercury, "is generally admitted by the
gentlemen of the press." In the Senate there were "none of greater
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national stature," according to Hiram Johnson. "Outstanding as
a national liberal," was William Keleher's appraisal in his Memoirs. 17 Cutting spoke frequently on national radio. Several times
he was mentioned for'the Presidency, even by Huey Long (the
Senator whom Wolf insists dwarfed Cutting in national prominence). He even appears in Mary McCarthy's The Group as "a
fighting gentleman Progressive." "It would be difficult to conceive of a greater blow to the progressive-radical movement in
America than his death," wrote Common Sense in 1935. 18
Cutting has also entered the exclusive company of politiCians
mentioned by our leading historians. He appears on fourteen
separate occasions in Schlesinger's three volumes on the New
Deal. In one of the finest single volumes on the period, Leuchtenberg's Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Cutting is quoted or cited four
times. Even recent scholarship on the Hoover Administration
finds a place for Cutting. 19 Allegations of his greatness might be
denied; Cutting's national prominence should not be.
I can hear Professor Wolf saying "So what? Where's the evidence that New Mexicans knew of or cared about Cutting's
reputation as a leading Progressive?" There is no precise measure
for public knowledge, ,of course, but it seems clear the voters were
frequently exposed to the Senator's left-wing ideology. Cutting
often made the point that his repudiation of the Republican Party
in 1932 was based on its conservatism and that his readoption of
the party in 1934 was conditioned on acceptance of his ideology.
"He has been pretty consistently lib~ral," the Albuquerque
Tribune said grudgingly in early 1934. That year the GOP platform was "even more liberal than the New Deal," according to
Fleta Springer in the New Republic. "Cutting was a New Dealer,"
Seligmann contends, "before most of the New Mexico politiCians
had realized that it existed." Although considered a moderate
before 1934, Dennis Chavez became "recognized as the leader of
conservatives among the Democrats," the Farmington Times-Hustler alleged, "[Chavez and the Democrats] are rallying the conservatives of all parties under their banner to defeat the liberal
Senator Cutting."2O
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More indicationsof Cutting's ideology came from endorsements.
All nationally known progressives supported him; many traveled
to New Mexico to say so. His support" of Labor was recognized by
the" A.F. of L. and its President, William Green. The radical
Farmers' Holiday Association wanted him returned to Congress.
John E. Miles, state Democratic chairman in 1934, charged "that
Bronson Cutting contributed to the Communist party, both national and local." The Senator never denied such contributions.
Clyde Tingley, the Democrat for Governor, called Cutting "a
disgrace" since Herbert Hoover believed him "a dangerous radical." As Professor Wolf admits, New Mexicans were not accustomed to such a national storm over their politicians. My bet is
that many of Cutting's statements seeped into the public's consciousness, abetted by comments of others all along the political"
spectrum. "Party lines have been wiped out," Owen White said
in Colliers, "everybody is either for or against Cutting."21
ROOSEVELT'S ENDORSEMENT OF DENNIS CHAVEZ

PROFESSOR WOLF declares that Presidents simply do not endorse
candidates outside their own party in any but the most unusual
circumstances. He cites a variety of obvious risks that dissuade the
national leader from such endorsements (including the injunction
that "Presidents are also aware that incumbents have a marked
advantage in getting re-elected." Need we be reminded that Cutting was the incumbent?) Wolf's comments are pertinent to most
situations. I. suggest, however, that his theory of Presidential endorsements, along with a superficial knowledge of New Deal coalitions in Congress, leads him to notable errors about the particular
case of New Mexico's Senate seat in 1934.
First, I get the impression from Wolf's writing that he thinks
Franklin Roosevelt had a series of consistent proposals in a reform
package for America. These were called "the New Deal." Wolf
speaks of FDR being "moved by votes for his programs not by
campaign oratory." So, we can total up the votes of Cutting and
Chavez for the President's "programs" to discover how much
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support each gave to "the New DeaL" Using proposals that came
to have Presidential approval before Congressional passage, a
hasty search of the Congressional Record indicates about equal
support. More important than this exercise is the point made by
many post-Schlesinger scholars. They conclude that the New Deal
was not a set of "programs" drawn by the Administration but
rather attempts by Roosevelt to coordinate various groups so they
could frame proposals. 22 "Gradually, haltingly, incoherently, almost haphazardly another possibility was emerging," .writes Ellis
Hawley about the Administration's reaction to the problems of
monopoly, "one that sprang not from any preconceived plan, but
rather from the process of political compromise, the conflict of
ideals, and the interplay of power between rival pressure groups."
Hawley's description applies well to most of Roosevelt's "programs." The President's greatest strength was his ability to draw
groups into the power structure, to give them aid and encouragement, and to elicit their ideas which he might then endorse. His
passion was to please as many organized groups in America as possible. "Weave them together!" Roosevelt told a speechless Raymond Moley after reading two contradictory tariff proposals. The
President's gift was not formulation of his own program, but
making room for the programs of others. 23
The Senate Progressives had a program. Their ranks varied,
but the most consistent members were Robert Wagner, George
Norris, William Borah, Gerald Nye, Burton Wheeler, Huey Long
(in his milder moments), Edward Costigan, Robert LaFollette
Jr., Hiram Johnson, and Bronson Cutting. Always full of "an
instinctive sympathy for the underdog" as Senator Borah put it,
these Progressives had kept a determined vigil during the Hoover
years, alone pressing the President for substantial relief measures
and social legislation. They were inflamed by the abuses of big
business they found everywhere. Cutting was particularly abusive
about Hoover's "trickle-down theory" of relief whereby money
from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation would gradually
reach the masses after the great corporations were saved. A conference called by these Progressives in 193 I received wide publi-

PICKENS: REPLY TO WOLF

349

city for its strong proposals and commendations from Governor
Franklin Roosevelt of New York. Urging government action
against monopolies, for labor unions and public works and small
farmers, and nationalization of key industries, these Progressives
were loud when aroused and sternly critical of those men and
ideas which the middle-class community often held in high regard. 24
Although they increasingly disagreed with Roosevelt as the
New Deal unfolded, the President respected many of their
efforts. "They were inventive and they knew how to carry on a
dialogue" so that even had Roosevelt disagreed with their goals,
the Progressives would have played a significant role in so experimental an administration. Most New Deal measures with the
sharpest breaks from the past (strong control over credit, public
ownership of power facilities, steeply graduated income tax,
Federal assistance for labor unions) came from out of their midst.
Though the great majority of their votes went for New Deal
legislation, they criticized the President for ending the CWA, for
allowing price collusion under NRA, for permitting. company
unions, and for deBationary tactics such as the Economy Act of
1933 and veterans' cuts. Still, they consistently defended the New
Deal against charges of socialism, communism, and unreasonable
attacks on business. Even in their most heated disagreements with
Roosevelt, theirs was an anger of disappointment, not disavowal:
"complaints . . . about an erring brother."25
Roosevelt had other reasons to be fond of these Progressives. His
political life up to the Presidency had been part of their tradition.
During the Depression he came to share their attitude about the
stupidity and excesses of many businessmen, especially financiers.
He agreed that government must help "the Forgotten American."
Though Roosevelt's reformist zeal was tempered by place and
circumstance, at times he shared the concern of Senate Progressives that politics be conducted along lines of ideology rather than
expediency. His attempted purge of Southern Democrats in 1938
was based on his announced "right to intervene in elections
whenever there was a clear issue of principle." "If we have the
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right kind of people," Roosevelt told the press in 1934 with
overtones for the Progressives, "the party label· does not mean
so very much." He then endorsed laFollette and Johnson that
year and Norris against a Democrat two years later. On a wintry
night in Albany, the President-elect had told Tugwell: "We'll
have eight years in Washington. By that time there may not be a
Democratic party, but there will be a progressive one."26
It is questionable, of course, that Roosevelt was completely
serious about reorienting the parties on ideological grounds. I
think Roosevelt disagreed, not with the ultimate justice of the
Progressives' cause, but with their "rugged individualism" in
politics. Conservatives struck with the power of a clenched fist,
the President said, while "the progressives are like a man trying
to strike with his fingers spread out stiffly. He would accomplish
nothing and would very likely break his fingers." Though he did
not share their temperament or sense of righteousness, the President's sympathies reveal an admiration for the lonely grandeur of
the Progressives' struggle. They were pure though sometimes
tragic types, at least in the halls of Congress. "If Franklin had not
been a Roosevelt," Tugwell reflected, "I am quite certain he would
have liked to be a LaFollette."27
As business became disillusioned with the New Deal in 1934;
as there rose a "resurgence on the right," and as critics such as
Father Coughlin, Huey Long, and Dr. Townsend captured the
popular imagination with demagoguery (Roosevelt's view), the
President came to depend more on the Senate's "responsible"
Progressives. In short, Roosevelt's political traditions as well as
practical considerations led him toward the Republicans among
the Progressives, including Bronson Cutting. 28
. Here is where Professor Wolf's opinion on the .President's endorsement of Chavez is faulty. Most contemporary commentators
and later 'historians have found the endorsement quite problematical. As "a persistent student of New Mexico politics," Wolf
should be aware that the decision Roosevelt faced in 1934 was
not between Cutting and Chavez as single votes in Congress nor
between merely the Republican and Democratic parties. Rather,
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Chavez was a member of an amorphous, Democratic majority that
had little in common except for party affiliation and respect for
the President's awesome power at this time. On the other hand,
Cutting was a member of a small though powerful band of Senate Progressives, bound together by what they perceived as "the
interest of the little man." I
Nor was Cutting on the periphery of these Senators. Bitter
exchanges occurred between the Progressives and Roosevelt about
his support for Chavez. "I took the opportunity," Harold Ickes
said at campaign's end, 1934, "to tell [FDR] that the opposition of
the Administration to Senator Cutting of New Mexico had
created a bad feeling among the Progressives of the West. Senator
Johnson was very much worked up." Later, George Norris spoke
bitterly of "the disgraceful and unwarranted fight made to drive
Senator Cutting out of public office. .. . It is a blot upon the
record of the Administration." Heartened by Cutting's victory, the
Progressives were again furious that Roosevelt did not quash the
election contest of Dennis Chavez for Cutting's seat. "It was quite
the most upsetting political development of last week," Raymond
Swing'said in the Nation, "for it throws into doubt the President's
entire informal alliance with the Progressives. . . ." The article
concluded that even Democratic leaders opposed the contest.~
Cutting's death in 1935 revealed the depths of affection these
Progressives had for the New Mexican. Norris wept openly on
the Senate Hoor. Borah, his face Hushed with grief, told the New
York Times "it is one of those times that you have no language to
express yourself." Huey Long" 'broke down' and cried" when an
aide rushed to him with the news. Bob LaFollette could not bring
himself to the Senate that day and later named one of his sons
after his friend. "So many of us could have been more easily
spared," said Senator Nye. "No man has performed more signal
service," said Senator Johnson. This tragic death, New York
Senator Wagner told reporters, "deprives the nation of a great
leader who understood these critical times as few men have;"
"Cutting was unique among the Progressives," Schlesinger wrote
later, "and adored by them."30
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. The point is that President Roosevelt was well aware of the
risk he was taking in turning his back on Cutting in .1934- The
Senator was a popular incumbent not stained by the repudiated
Republicanism of Hoover. He was in the inner. circle of a group
of Senators whose support the Administration badly needed.
Cutting's triumphant return to the Senate would mean a political
reputation enhanced tenfold by victory over a powerful President's
opposition. Chavez in the Senate could hardly have been so important to. Roosevelt or Democratic unity.. In the article I offered
one among several explanations for Roosevelt's action. Professor
Wolf may justifiably argue that others were more important. To
insist, however, that the Chavez endorsement is not an important
problem in political historiography simply ignores the events and
their context. In this case a theory of Presidential endorsements
must give way to the historical situation.
CONCLUSION

REGARDLESS of Wolf's many astute criticisms, I believe the major
points in my article still stand. Even though Cutting was erratic in
political alliances, switched party labels often, and was guilty of
tough-minded opportunism, his ideology about government's role
in social and economic affairs remained consistent over these years.
Cutting tried to bring lower-class New Mexicans into a political
coalition based on their economic interests. Hewas a "radical" who
supported massive government intervention in the economy, elaborate systems of security for workers and consumers, and strict
regulation of private enterprise. He was a national leader who
brought the Senate Progressives' solutions for Depression to the
public in a forceful and articulate way. Roosevelt opposed Cutting
in 1934 only after careful thought, a good deal of political risk,
and an awareness that Cutting was a rival to his own leadership.
My thanks to the New Mexico Historical Review for publishing
this exchange. Also, thanks to my friend and former teacher, T.
Phillip Wolf; I shall try to return the "favor" some day. Perhaps
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our dialogue has revealed some problems of examining history 'as
well as reviewing a fascinating period in. New' Mexico politics.
Each of us is' likely guilty of being "intellectual" in' the sense
President Eisenhower used the term: "a man who takes more
words than are necessary to tell more than he knows."
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me~bers and their financial support for the party. I think we are all aware,
as he belabors the point, that the resources, influence, and opinion leadership are the ingredients of power for the wealthy, not the strength of theif
votes. If he felt I meant "votes" so narrowly, my apologies.·
6. To illustrate the ways Republicans were responding to the needs
of lower-class New Mexicans, I would point out that the 1929 legislature
increased appropriations and assistance for the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District (after complaints by Spanish-Americans about assessments), passed a much stronger Workmen's Compensation bill, and almost
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factionalism during the 1929 Legislature, I offer the fpllowing synopsis of
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balance of power then. (3). The Older Interpretation that Party PoWer
was the Major Issue. I am puzzled by Wolfs question of referent for the
phrase "such a view insists" (p. 14). He asks is the "view" mine or Andrea
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point in the text. The phrase immediately follows others such as "the
usual explanation ... [Parker] continues this interpretation," and Parker's analysis of the motivations within the quotation. Such a view (I hope
the referent is clear now) argues along lines similar to Wolf that the
commissioner fight was primarily for party control and patronage.
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One of the largest contributors to this group for FDR was Bronson Cutting's mother.
28. ''Resurgence on the Right" is a chapter title in Schlesinger, The
Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal (Boston, 1958), p. 421.
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29. Quotations from Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L.
Ickes: The First Thousand Days, 1933-6 (New York, 1953), p. 217;
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THE PURGE THAT FAILED:
THE 1934 SENATORIAL ELECTION IN NEW MEXICO:
YET ANOTHER VIEW

G. L. SELIGMANN,

JR.

I traveled 82 miles on election day in my car, transporting
Democrats to and from the polls.!
Ruth Hanna McCormick Siinms

T

HE SENATORIAL election of 1934 represented the culmination of Bronson M. Cutting's political career. 2 The fruits of the
past-both bitter-and sweet-were harvested. His old disregard for
party lines and party loyalties partially backfired. Both parties.
split, the old Guard Republicans formed "Tingley-Chavez Clubs"
while the left wing of the Democratic party supported Cutting
over Dennis Chavez, the apparent choice of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt. The majority of the New Mexico American Legion
remained true to Cutting. He ·also retained the trust of the Catholic Mexican-American voters although his opponent, Dennis
Chavez, had grown up in fairly humble surroundings and was
himself a Hispano Catholic. It was this latter support that gave
Cutting the victory. In short the election was not characterized by
a normal grouping of factions and parties.
After the Republican defeat in 1932 political alignments would
have to shift in order for the New Mexico GOP to regain a
preeminent position. To accomplish this many Republicans hoped
to bring Cutting back into the party fold. The task was made
easier by the death of Arthur Seligman, the Democratic Governor
to whom Cutting had· given support. Had Seligman lived, the
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task of wooing Cutting back into the Republican party might
indeed have been difficult-Cutting probably could have retained
the support of the Seligman faction. 3 With the election of Congressman Dennis Chavez as Seligman's replacement on the Democratic National Committee the A. T. Hannett-Clyde TingleyDennis Chavez faction gained control of the Democratic Party.
Although Chavez denied it, he appeared to be the only person in
the Democratic party who could run Cutting a close race. 4 Republican leaders such as B. C. Hernandez, Reed Holleman, and
Albert Simms and his wife Ruth Hanna McCormick Simms began
making overtures to Cutting during the fall of 1933. Hernandez
went so far as to say Cutting had not bolted the Republican Convention in 1932 but, "we threw him out of our stacked convention."5 The only important opposition to reunion came from
H. O. Bursum, Cutting's long-time antagonist who felt that "The
party should base its action on principle, integrity, and self-respect,
and not the doctrine of expediency."6
In the spring of 1 934 Cutting indicated to the regular Republicans that he intended to support them. The Santa Fe New Mexican, which he owned, backed the entire Republican ticket in the
April Santa Fe city elections. 7 Cutting privately informed his supporters that he probably could not gain endorsement from the
Democratic Administration unless he formally changed party
allegiance. s In April the New Mexico Legislature chose its leaders
from the Tingley-Hannett-Chavez faction of the Democratic
party. Moreover, some of the more important Cutting leaders,
such as Maurice Meira, were not at all enthusiastic about fusion
and indicated they would remain with the Republicans should
Cutting switch allegiance. 9 On May 16 the Republican Central
Committee voted to explore the possibilities of reconciliation with
the Cutting Progressives. 1O But some Democrats still hoped to
arrange a shift of party alignments. Early in July Clinton P.
Anderson, then the State Treasurer of the Democratic Party, announced he had asked James Farley "to put the support of the
Democratic organization behind the Progressive-Republican Senator."ll It is unlikely Farley could have worked out such an ar-
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rangement, even if he had wanted to. The New Mexico Democratic Central Committee had already banned from their agenda
any discussions concerning a possible merger. Cutting wrote
Otero:
It seems to me, obvious that since the meeting of the Democratic
State Central Committee last Monday, that there is absolutely no selfrespecting way in which we can play ball with that organization. This
at least clears air, even though the other alternatives may not be any
too agreeable.
Under the circumstances I do not believe that Jim Farley can
influence the situation in any way.12

When he arrived in New Mexico a few days later, Farley was
noncommittal. According to the New Mexican his "hands-off
policy was taken to mean that the Democrats would select an out
and out Democratic ticket this fall and make no overture to Senator Cutting who gave the party his support in 1932."13 Cutting
had to choose between returning to the Republican fold or running as a Progressive in a state with a strong two-party tradition.
Cutting chose to run as a Republican. The Republican state
chairman, Ed Safford-under pressure from the county leadersresigned on July 12. He was replaced by Peter Rapkoch, a longtime Cutting supporter. 14 In addition to becoming the state chairman Rapkoch created two committees: one fixed the time, place
and apportionment of the nominating convention: the other consisted of a committee of five to "purge the party of irreconcilables."15 Cutting also met with former Republican Governor
Richard Dillon. They announced a tentative platform modeled
after the Progressive platform of 1932, which included increased
educational facilities, increased social services, legislative reapportionment, an eight-hour day, and other "liberal" innovations. 16
Rapkoch's committee to purge the party did not have to search too
far to find "irreconcilables" in the Republican ranks. On the same
day the existence of the loyalty committee was made public, an
announcement was made of a conference of such prominent Republicans as H. O. Bursum, Ed Safford, and others, and including
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John Miles, the state Democratic Chairman, to discuss Cutting's
Republican candidacy. At the end of the meeting Bursum released
a statement to the press concluding "the conference expressed the
opinion that there is no reason apparent why any Republican
should cast his vote for Mr. Cutting. The conference definitely
determined that there will be organized opposition to the re-election of Mr. Cutting."17 Cutting left New Mexico in the early
part of August for a trip to Alaska, ostensibly to investigate the
chances of opening the public lands there to homesteading, but
most likely to prepare himself for the coming campaign. IS
When Cutting returned to the state in early September, he had
received the endorsement of a variety of national figures: Robert
Scripps of the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain, Senators LaFollette (Rep.), Shipstead (Rep.), and Nye (Rep.), and Edward
Costigan of Colorado (Dem.), who later campaigned for Cutting
in northern New Mexico. 19 At a press conference upon his return,
Cutting reiterated the proposals he and Dillon had arrived at and
stated he would not run as a Republican unless a liberal platform .
was adopted by the state convention. He went on to remark that
if the platform was sufficiently liberal, it would really make little
difference who the nominees were. 20 Undoubtedly unhappy at the
splintering process going on in the Republican party, he was
pleased that factions of the Democratic party were breaking off
to form Cutting clubs in Santa Fe, Rio Arriba, Harding, and San
Juan counties-northern counties which were mainly Republican. 21
The Republican convention opened on September 24 with the
keynoter condemning the Democratic party for its "vote right or
starve" policies. He was followed by Cutting who chastised the
state's Democratic administration for its advocacy of the sales
tax. 22 Cutting received the nomination for the long term in the
Senate while Dillon got the nomination for the short term. Jaffa
Miller, the superintendent of the Industrial or Reform School,
received the gubernatorial nomination, Maurice Meira was the
convention's choice for Congress and Jose Gonzales for Lieutenant
Governor. 23
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The Democrats held their convention two days later. After a
brief factional struggle, they nominated Dennis Chavez to run
against Cutting, and Carl Hatch against Dillon. Tingley received
the nomination for Governor. John J. Dempsey was chosen to
run for Congress. 24 Chavez at the time could have received any
nomination he wished and was under some pressure to run for the
short term in the Senate to avoid having' to face Cutting. In
deciding to make the race he was probably influenced by a desire
to replace Cutting as the leader of the Hispanic voters in the
state.25
In looking over the tickets it is difficult to say which was favored
at the outset. Chavez was probably the second most popular man
in the state, and he had the advantage of being a Democrat. Both
Hatch and Dillon were well known, but Dillon had been out of
office several years while Hatch had been in the Senate a year.
Early in the campaign it appeared Meira had a distinct advantage
over Dempsey for he was a native-born Spanish-speaking New
Mexican. Dempsey, who was originally from New York, had
moved west at a fairly late age. However, he had been serving as
National Recovery Administration Director for the state of New
Mexico and had become closely identified with the New DeaL In
1934 this was a great advantage. At the state level Miller was
probably better known around the state than Clyde Tingley, whose
sole political experience had been in the realm of Albuquerque
and Bernalillo county activities, but Tingley had received an excellent grounding in professional politics. 26 No matter how well
qualified the Republican candidates were, 1934 was a Democratic
year in New Mexico, as in the rest of the nation, and the Democrats could probably have beaten any Republican for any office,
with the single exception of Bronson M. Cutting. However, his
presence on the Republican ticket put the Democrats in a difficult
campaigning position. They could not run as pro- versus anti-New
Dealers. Cutting was a New Dealer before most of the New
Mexico politicians had realized that it existed.
Cutting's only opposition to the President was over veterans'
policies. To attack Cutting for opposing these policies, however,
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could only increase his popularity with the veterans and their
supporters. The Democnltic campaign tactic was to stress the need
for Democrats in Washington since they could best cooperate with
the ,national administration. Cutting, on the other hand, campaigned on his record, which he continually compared to Chavez's.
Both parties disavowed mud-slinging-but engaged in it at will.
According to one newspaper account Cutting was called "fat boy,
damn nuisance, jackass, traitor, hands dripping with blood,
damned Progressive, wild bull, adulterer, unmarried and rich, the
Cutting Blight, Jesus Christ Cutting and a political butcher."27
Cutting charged that Chavez had done nothing in the House except "sit in his seat and vote."28 Cutting defended his record in
the Senate where he had supported labor, voted against the Bankhead Cotton Bill, voted for the sulphur permit bill and supported
legislation to ease the obstacles in the way of prospecting for oil
and gas on government land. Naturally he stressed his support of
the veterans and their interests.29
The New Mexico campaign had national implications for the
Progressive bloc. Senators Johnson, Shipstead, Costigan, Nye,
LaFollette, and Norris endorsed him publicly. So did Fiorello La
Guardia and Harold Ickes. Senators Steiwer and Costigan both
spoke on his behalf in the state, where Steiwer accused Chavez of
failing to support legislation to help ex-servicemen. Cutting
received the endorsement of William Green, the President of the
American Federation of Labor and by the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen as well as the active support of the Oil Association. The
Farmers' Holiday Association instructed its members in New
Mexico to work for his re-election. 30 Nor was he without friends
with access to the White House. Both Senator Norris and Secretary Ickes voiced their disapproval of the Democratic Party's opposition to Cutting directly to the President. At first Norris, calling
it "a case of awful ingratitude,"3l blamed the policy on Jim
Farley. Later he blamed the President himself for the episode. 32
Ickes told the President that "the opposition of the Administration
to Senator Cutting in New Mexico, had created a bad feeling
among the Progressives in the West. Senator Johnson was very
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much worked up over this and I too am very unhappy over it."33
Dennis Chavez also claimed champions from out of state. The
principal attraction was a speaking tour of the state by Senator
Joe Robinson, the Senate Majority Leader. Cutting challenged
Robinson to a public debate on the general topic of support given
to New Deal legislation but the challenge went unanswered. 34
The Cutting forces accused Chavez of padding the welfare rolls
with his relatives and of using welfare funds for political purposes. The Democrats distributed a handbill quoting John Miles as
saying "I have the proof that Bronson M. Cutting contributed to
the Communist Party, both national and local, and he has not
denied these charges."35 The Literary Digest may not have been
completely inaccurate when it referred to the election battle as a
struggle between "Outlander Baronies."36
The National Guard appeared in several counties on election
day. The Governor, however, denied having ordered the troops
out. He later admitted he had given the Adjutant General the
authority to bring out the troops if they were needed. 37 The initial
returns gave Cutting a margin of 1,284 votes but the remainder of
the Republican ticket went down in defeat. Cutting carried a total
of nineteen of the state's thirty-one counties. He lost only Rio
Arriba and Socorro counties from that group of Hispanic counties
which had been the backbone of the Republican Party since
statehood. The victory came despite the fact that the leading Old
Guard Republicans had withdrawn from the party and, in the
words of one of the leaders, taken "the whole organization into
the Democratic Camp. We wrecked the GOP organization, but
we were willing to do it to beat Cutting. We nearly did it too but
we were counted out."38 Some kind of arrangement had obviously
been made, for H. O. Bursum was later named to the Interstate
Streams Commission and in some counties local Republicans were
given places on the Democratic ticket. 39 Cutting was elected by
his core of Mexican American supporters. (See Table I.)
Before the State Canvassing Board could meet to certify Cutting
a victory, the Chavez forces contested the election by filing a motion to disregard the returns from sixty-seven precincts in San
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Miguel County on the grounds that between fifteen and twenty
per cent of those voting were not duly registered. 40 Following
two separate investigations into the returns, which resulted in
increasing Cutting's total by fourteen votes and the filing of a
Republican countersuit by the defeated candidates, the Canvassing Board issued Cutting a certificate of election when it was
ordered to by the State Supreme Court. 41 The Chavez faction
then shifted the fight to the United States Senate, charging
excessive use of money in the campaign. This despite the fact
that an investigator from the Senate· had been in the state prior
to the election and found nothing to justify a hearing. 42
As Table I shows, Cutting did not attain the same high percentage against Dennis Chavez as he had against the Anglo
J. S. Vaught in 1928. But in those areas of the state most predominantly Hispanic, Chavez ran behind Cutting. Chavez also
ran significantly behind his showing in the 1932 election when he
ran against Jose D. Armijo. Chavez's ethnic and religious background apparently helped him in these areas but not enough to
overcome their traditional Republican traditions, particularly when
the Republican in question was such tried and true amigo as
Senator Cutting, "El Viejo." In those precincts in San Miguel
County which have been identified as being heavily Penitente and
therefore the most tradition bound as well as the most isolated
precincts, the same trend holds true. 43 Here Chavez had been
beaten by Armijo in 1932 when ethnic origin and religion could
not have possibly been an issue. In 1934 when the seeds of such
conflict were present, Cutting improved on Armijo's vote by almost
five percentage points. It was, of course, in this county that the
bulk of Chavez's legal challenges lay but it remains a distinct
possibility that Cutting was simply more popular in this part of
the state and with this type of voter than was Chavez.
While Chavez's ethnic origin and religion might not have
helped him in the heavily Hispano areas of the state, it appears to
have harmed him on the east side of the state in the area known as
"Little Texas," Here, when the voters had the choice between the
two Hispano candidates in 1932, they had kept their traditional

TABLE I: ELECTION RETURNS FROM PREDOMINANTLY HISPANIC COUNTIES

1932

1928
County
Dona Ana
Guadalupe
Mora
Rio Arriba
San Miguel
Sandoval
Santa Fe
Socorro
Taos
Valencia
TOTAL

Vaught
Vote

2306
1131
1661
2204
2932
1045
2364
1362
1572
956
17536

%
42.4
39.7
44.5
33.2
33.6
35.9
30.8
38.5
36.3
21.5
34.9

Cutting
Vote

3132
1717
2075
4428
5789
1868
5299
2177
2755
3499
32739

%
57.6
60.3
55.5
66.8
66.4
64.1
69.2
61.5
63.7
78.5
65.1

Chavez
Vote

4977
1899
2873
3032
4610
1837
5710
2539
3138
2344
32959

%
66.0
54.0
65.3
37.1
44.4
54.4
61.1
57.3
51.3
42.7
52.5

Armijo
Vote

2560
1616
1527
5148
5767
1541
3636
1890
2981
3151
29815

1934
%
34.0
46.0
34.7
62.9
55.6
45.6
38.9
42.7
48.7
57.3
47;5

Chavez
Vote

3617
1643
2330
4449
4006
1768
4988
2479
2774
2142
30196

%
48.5
45.3
51.3
52.4
36.9
45.9
49.7
54.8
46.2
39.9
46.6

Cutting
Vote

3834
1986
2209
4042
6852
2087
5040
2046
3233
3224
34553

%
51.5
54.7
48.7
47.6
63.1
54.1
50.3
45.2
53.8
60.1
53.4
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TABLE II: VOTING RETURNS 29 RURAL PENITENTE PRECINCTS IN SAN MIGUEL COUNTY

Precinct
San Miguel
La Cuesta
Tecolote
San Antonio
Pecos
San Geronimo
Rociada
Sapello
Las Manuelitas
Casa Colorado
Sabinoso
Los Alamos
Canon Manuelitas
Puertecito
San Isidro
Las Gallinas
El Cerrito
Los Torres
Tecolotito

Vaught
Vote
36
15
25
3
141
48
22
33
24
6
31
13
22
48
54
0
0
3
6

1928
Cutting
Vote
%
31.0
80
9.4
144
20.0
99
64
4.5
35.5
256
41.4
68
40.0
33
47.1
37
50
32.4
7.2
77
35.6
56
28.3
33
33.8
43
48.0
52
48.2
58
83
6.7
37
0
5.4
53
10.5
51

%

69.0
90.6
79.8
95.5
64.5
58.6
60.0
52.9
67.6
92.8
64.4
71.7
66.2
52.0
51.8
93.3
100
94.6
89.5

Chavez
Vote
38
33
58
22
256
50
29
47
32
12
34
38
30
34
48
50
30
11

50

1932
Armijo
Vote
%
34.5
72
15.9
174
49.6
59
22.2
77
46.7
292
67
42.7
65
30.9
54.0
40
67
32.3
26.7
33
28.1
87
57.6
28
32.6
62
27.5
90
72.7
18
45.5
60
48.4
32
29.7
26
62.5
30

%

65.5
84.1
50.4
72.8
53.3
57.3
69.1
46.0
67.7
73.3
71.9
42.4
67.4
72.5
27.3
54.5
51.6
70.3
37.5

Chavez
Vote
49
66
62
10

201
61
40
59
39
0
34
28
39
57
48
43
6
4
41

%

44.1
28.3
43.1
11.4
37.4
44.9
44.4
54.6
37.9
0
26.8
48.3
43.3
44.5
63.2
36.1
10.2
19.0
47.7

1934
Cutting
Vote
%
62
55.9
167
71.7
82
56.9
78
88.6
62.6
336
75
55.1
50
55.6
49
45.4
62.1
64
120
100
93
73.2
30
51.7
51
56.7
71
55.5
28
36.8
76
63.9
53
89.8
17
81.0
45
52.3

Bernal
Ojitos Frios
Cherryvale
Empazado
Trementina
AguaZarca
San Ignacio
Las Colonias
Gonzales
Santa Ana
TOTAL

13
14
10
22
32
--0
20
39
46
6
738

15.1
16.5
52.6
30.1
19.6
0
24.1
44.3
44.7
16.7
27.7

73
71
9
51
131
16
63
49
57
30
1924

84.9
83.5
47.4
69.9
80.4
100
75.9
55.7
55.3
83.3
72.3

61
34
13
21
130
3
15
37
61
23
1300

47.3
39.6
52.0
29.2
52.2
12.0
17.9
41.1
44.2
48.9
40.6

68
52
12
51
119
22
69
58
77
24
1929

52.7
60.4
48.0
70.8
47.R
88.0
82.1
58.9
55.8
5I.l
59.4

61
19
9
39
73
8
20
34
66
4
1220

40.9
20.7
23.7
54.2
33.5
40.0
20.8
36.2
45.8
10.5
35.9

88
73
29
33
145
.12
76
60
78
34
2175

59.1
79.3
76.3
45.8
66.5
60.0
79.2
63.8
54.2
89.5
64.1
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TABLE III: ELECTION RETURNS FROM "LITTLE TEXAS" COUNTIES

1932

1928
County
Chaves
Curry
De Baca
Eddy
Lea
Roosevelt
TOTAL

Vaught
Vote

1798
2303
614
1577
780
1654
8726

%

Cutting
Vote

39.7
61.8
59
55.1
71.8
70
55.5

2846
1424
427
1285
306
710
6998

%

Chavez
Vote

61.3
38.2
41
44.9
28.2
30
44.5

4402
3661
1025
3593
2317
2831
17829

1934

%

Armijo
Vote

73.6
82.7
80
83.4
90.4
86.4
81.6

1581
768
256
715
245
446
40 II

%

Chavez
Vote

%

Cutting
Vote

%

26.4
17.3
20
16.6
9.6
13.6
18.4

2866
3139
605
2658
1652
1919
12839

52.3
65.8
47.9
68.5
70.4
66.4
66.2

2618
1632
652
1223
694
971
7795

47.7
34.2
52.1
31.5
29.6
33.6
33.8
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political ties to the Democratic party intact and given Chavez, an
overwhelming 81.6 per cent of the total vote. 44 Two years later,
when it was Chavez against Cutting, the Democrat dropped
fifteen percentage points and 5,000 votes. If Chaves County,
which was a Cutting stronghold,45 is eliminated the scale tips
slightly in the direction of Chavez. It is still obvious when compared with the election of 1932 that Dennis Chavez's not being
a white Anglo Saxon Protestant was detrimental to his candidacy
in this area. Cutting did not run as well in these counties as he
had in 1928. These are the most heavily Protestant and Southernoriented counties in the state. They are well known for their antiCatholic sentiment. There is, therefore, a distinct possibility that
Cutting received the benefits of some anti-Catholic straight-ticket
voting in 1928. The primarily Indian precincts in the state do not
lend themselves to any sort of pattern. 46 They voted for Chavez in
1932 by the same percentage that they voted against him in 1934.
There is no ready explanation for this.
Why did Cutting have to run against an administration-backed
candidate in the first place? He had supported Roosevelt; why
was the favor not reciprocated? On this question the authorities,
when they deal with it at all, are in agreement. The President and
Cutting split over the veterans issue. 41 These authors, however,
leave this reader with a confused view of the problem. The general image they present is that of Roosevelt as a master politician,
and it does not seem that a politician of such competence would
have dealt with Cutting the way he did. The President surely
knew that one of the central pillars of Cutting's support was the
veterans and he also must have known that Cutting was genuinely
concerned with their problems and that these problems would
surely increase if their pensions were cut. In short, to this author,
it does not appear that the punishment of administration opposition quite fitted the crime of opposing the White House on this
one issue, particularly since by almost any criterion it was not
central to the New Deal program. Peter Rapkoch, one of Cutting's strongest supporters in New Mexico, in a memorandum
written in 1936, notes that Cutting also opposed the transfer of
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legislative power to the executive and the many bureaus and commissions that "regimented society." He also opposed the destruction of food and crops under the AgriculturalAdjustment Administration. 48 While Cutting may well have been in opposition to
these aspects of the New Deal, he did not publicly raise these
points, and this author has found no supporting evidence for this
contention in his papers. There is, moreover, no mention of these
complaints in the memoirs and published diaries of individuals
in the administration such as Tugwell and Ickes, both of whom
consider the election in the works cited earlier. This lack of evidence leads the present writer to conclude there is a distinct possibility Rapkoch was reading some of the later criticisms of the
New Deal into an earlier situation.
There is, however, another explanation of why Cutting found
the full weight of the administration thrown against him in New
Mexico during the election-and in Washington during the contesting of the election. 49 The President may have viewed Cutting
as a potential threat either as a possible Republican, or more likely
as a Progressive, nominee, and desired to remove him from public
life by the most effective means at hand. This interpretation tends
to fit the general picture of Roosevelt as it has been brought into
focus by the variClus students of the President and the period.
Moreover, it tends to agree with some small bits of evidence available regarding the administration of patronage in New Mexico in
this period, as well as a letter written by Cutting in which he
discussed brieRy his relationship with the President.
In a letter dated October 1933, before the final break with the
President is supposed to have occurred, Cutting wrote his friend
and confidant Phelps Putnam, "The whole damn Federal patronage has been turned over to my bitterest enemies, and now that
Seligman is dead, will have the whole state outfit against us as
well."50 However, Ickes presents a different story, "I [Ickes] do
not intend to make any appointments in New Mexico that won't
help him [Cutting]. He is very modest about patronage and has
never asked me for anything."51
-The interpretation that there was a personal break between Cut-

376

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW XLVII:4 1972

ting and the President also does not seem valid when compared
with the letter cited earlier, stating Roosevelt would support him
for the Senate if he were to run as a Democrat, a letter dated.after
the supposed break.52 The President must have been at least
partially motivated by political self-interest in the matter of defeating Cutting. This contention is borne out by a letter from
Roosevelt to Colonel Edward M. House written after the 1934
election in which the President noted:
Progressive Republicans like LaFollette, Cutting, Nye, etc., who are
flirting with the idea of a third ticket anyway with the knowledge
that such a third ticket would be beaten but that it would defeat us,
elect a conservative Republican and cause a complete swing far to
the left before 1940.

in a discussion of "the schools of thought of our opponents at the
present time."53 A similar analysis of the political situation was
made by Huey Long in 1935. He could support Senators Borah,
Norris, Nye, Frazier, Wheeler or Cutting for the Presidency.54
This opinion of Cutting is also advanced in a book by John
Heaton published in 1932. Heaton argues that Hoover would
probably win again because the majority of the voting public was
Republican and
If Democracy fails to grasp the oppOItunity of becoming a majority
party insteaa of a minority party, then the interval between 1932 and
1936 should witness the birth of a new party drawing the left-wing
members from both the old parties. To succeed in this there is need
of organization and need of leaders. 55

Commenting on possibilities for leadership, Heaton noted "Senator Cutting of New Mexico is an interesting possibility."56
It appears there was a distinct possibility that the events Roosevelt discussed in the letter to Colonel House might well have come
true had not Huey Long been assassinated before the election of
1936. This author does not think there was any real possibility
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that Long himself might have been elected to the presidency. It
is difficult to believe he could· have commanded much effective
political support outside of the South, if for no other reason than
that his type was unknown to the United States outside of the
South. He appeared uncouth. Cutting did not suffer from this
handicap. If anything he was more progressive and at least as
aristocratic as Roosevelt. Moreover, he had money, and this is
something a third party needs desperately. To Roosevelt, with the
political acumen he apparently had, Bronson Cutting may have
represented a threat. This may have been the basic reason for the
contest in the state in 1934. 57 If there is any truth to this argument, it is indeed strange Roosevelt did not remember it when he
attempted to rid the party of Millard Tydings, Walter George,
et allater in the decade. To attempt to purge and then to lose is,
if anything, to strengthen your enemies. Cutting, as a result of his
victory, would have been a more powerful figure in the Senate and
in the state than before. This could hardly have been what the
President desired.

NOTES
1. Albuquerque Journal, Nov. 8, 1934, cited in John T. Russell, "New
Mexico: A Problem of Parochialism in Transition," American Political
Science Review, vol. 30, p. 287.
2. For a brief analysis of Cutting's political support see G. L. Seligmann, Jr., "Bronson M. Cutting, Politician" in Richard N. Ellis, ed., New
Mexico Past and Present (Albuquerque, 1971), pp. 222-29. The only
analysis of Cutting's entire career based on his papers is G. L. Seligmann,
Jr., "The Political Career of Senator Bronson M. Cutting" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona, Tucson, 1967). Other studies of
Cutting are Jonathan R. Cunningham, "Bronson Cutting" (unpublished
M.A. thesis University of New Mexico, 1940); Patricia Cardigan Armstrong, A Portrait of Bronson Cutting Through His Papers, University of
New Mexico Dept. of Government Bulletin No. 57 (Albuquerque, 1959);
Francis McGarity, "Bronson Cutting, Senator froI)1 New Mexico". (unpublished M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1934); and Andrea A.
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Parker "Arthur Seligman and Bronson Cutting: Coalition Government
in New Mexico" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico,
1969). An excellent listing of the other sources for this period of New
Mexico his,tory may be found in the notes to William H. Pi~kens, "Bronson Cutting vs Dennis Chavez: Battle of the Patrones in New Mexico,
1934," NMHR, vol. 46 (1971), pp. 5-36. I would like to thank my colleague Pr.ofessor Ronald Marcello for a number of very perceptive comments on the initial draft of this article. I didn't follow them all~perhaps
I should have.
3. For a description of Seligman's role as a Democratic party leader
and perhaps New Mexico's foremost practitioner of the art of coalition
building, see Paul A. F. Walter, "Necrology: Arthur Seligman," NMHR,
vol. 8 (1933), p. 314.
4.. For an example of such a Chavez denial, see Severino TrujilloBMC, Oct. 9, 1933. Bronson M. Cutting Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, hereafter referred to as BMC Papers. It should be
noted that Trujillo, a member of Cutting's Washington staff, did not
believe Chavez.
5. Santa Fe New Mexican, Nov. 20, 1933.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., March, April, 1934.
8. BMC-Phelps Putnam, March 21, 1934, BMC Papers.
9. Miguel B. Otero-BMC, May 5, 1934, Otero Papers, Zimmerman
Library, University of New Mexico.
10. Santa Fe New Mexican, May 17, 1934.
I I. Ibid., July 9, 1934.
12. BMC-Otero, July 13, 1934, Otero Papers.
13. Santa Fe New Mexican, July 17, 1934.
14· Ibid., July 13, 1934.
15· Ibid., July 13,193416. Ibid., July 21, 1934.
17· Ibid., July 23, 1934.
18. Ibid., Aug. 3, 1934.
19. In an interview with the author, Oscar Chapman, one of Costigan's law partners, said that Costigan asked Cutting in late 1933 to invite
him to campaign in New Mexico for him so that he (Costigan) could
claim a prior comnutment if pressure were brought on him to keep out
of the state. Interview dated Aug. 6, 1963.
20. Santa Fe New Mexican, Sept. I I, 1934.
21. Ibid., Aug. 25 and Sept. 14, 1934.
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Ibid., Sept. 24, 1934.
Ibid.
24. Ibid., Sept. 27, 1934.
22.
23.

25. Interviews with New Mexico politicians Cited in Cunningham,
p.19 2 •
26. The bulk of the above analysis is based on interviews with New
Mexico politicians referred to in Cunningham, pp. 192-93. Cunningham's conclusions are supplemented and supported by the author's conversations with members of both parties who were active in the party
battles of the period.
27. Albuquerque Journal, Oct. 23, 1934. This listing appeared in a
story denouncing Democratic mud-slinging. The author is unaware of a
similar listing prepared by an anti-Cutting newspaper.
28. Santa Fe New Mexican, Oct. I 1,1934.
29. Ibid., Oct. 26, 1934.
30. There are letters or telegrams from these individuals in the BMC

Papers."
31. Alfred Lief, Democracy's Norris: The Biography of a Lonely
Crusade (New York, 1939), p. 446.
3 2 • Ibid., p. 445. See also Norris-FDR, Jan. 13, 1934, President's
Personal File, FDR Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. The President's reply to
Norris about the Jack of patronage that Cutting was receiving was:
Dear George,

I wish you would speak to me some day about Bronson Cutting. As·
you know, I am personally mighty fond of him and have known him
since he was a boy. I do not want to do anything to hurt him, but a lot
of Bronson's retainers in New Mexico are not considered especially fine
citizens.
Very sincerely yours
While the President's analysis of the character of Cutting's follOwing is
not inaccurate, it should be noted that the same characterization could have
been applied to his opponents and their retinue.
33.. Ickes, Secret Diary, vol. I, p. 217. See also Ickes-FDR, Sept. 20,
1934, FDR L i b r a r y . "
34· Albuquerque Journal, Nov. 4, 1934. Also see the memorandum
from McIntyre to the President suggesting that Roosevelt "create the impression that Senator Robinson is representing you and the administration." McIntyre-FDR, Oct. 29, 1934, FDR Library.
35. Broadside in the BMC Papers.
36. Literary Digest, Nov. 3, 1934, p. 13.
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37. Santa Fe New Mexican, Nov. 6, 1934.
38. Interview cited in Jack E. Holmes, "Party, Legislature and
Governor in the Politics of New Mexico, 1911-1963" (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Chicago, 1964), pp. 199-200. The reference to being
counted out refers to the charges brought later of fraud in the election.
39. Ibid., p. 200.
40. Santa Fe New Mexican, Dec. 3, 1934. The BMC Papers contain
copies of all of the legal documents filed by both sides in the case but in
view of the fact that the actual details of the election contest are not
important to the theme of this paper the author will refer to the contest only
in passing. It is probably safe to say that while the Cutting forces were
not blameless in matters of voting fraud, neither were their opponents.
There is a letter in Cutting's papers containing an affidavit to the effect
that when a Mrs. Sturmquist and her husband went to vote in a strongly
Democratic area they found their names had been left off the poll books
although they were legally registered. However, both their son and
daughter had already voted despite the fact that they were both dead.
Mrs. A. W. Sturmquist-BMC, April 16, 1935, BMC Papers.
41. Santa Fe New Mexican, Dec. 3-3 1, 19344 2 • Ibid., Nov. 3, 1934.
43. See Table II. Holmes, "Party, Legislature and Governor," p. 343,
identifies these precincts as Penitente areas.
44- See Table III.
45. Edgar Puryear, Cutting's Administrative Assistant, was a former
Democratic State Representative from this county and J. D. Atwood who
was to represent Cutting in the election contest also resided here.Moreover, Cutting's efforts to get a Federal Land Office located in Roswell, the
county seat, undoubtedly paid dividends.
46. See Table IV.
47. See for example Rexford Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt,
p. 340; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, The Politics of
Upheaval (Boston, 1~0), pp. 139-40; and James MacGregor Burns,
Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York, 1956), p. 202. Raymond
Moley in The First New Deal (New York, 1966), p. 93, notes that in a
conversation with Cutting, the New Mexican "left to my inference ... a
basic distrust of Roosevelt-in some degree a sharing of the reservations
which were so common in the Eastern social and economic circles to
which Cutting had belonged in his earlier years. Later this distrust Bared
into opposition to a number of Roosevelt's policies. A healthy mutual
dislike grew up between them." Like many matters which are "left to
inference" this analysis is none too precise. To be sure Cutting came from
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a very wealthy, very prominent New York family. Such people did look
askance at FDR's policies but usually from a position somewhat to the
right: Cutting's opposition to the New Deal came from the left. Moreover
Cutting's letters to his mother for this period (February, 1933) do not show
any distrust of Roosevelt. That comes later.
48. Peter Rapkoch memorandum to Senator Robert M. LaFollette Jr.
dated 1936. Copy in the BMC Papers. As John L. Shover demonstrates
in "Populism in the Nineteen-Thirties: The Battle for the AAA," Agricultural History, vol. 39 (1965), pp. 17-24, the AAA was the first of those
measures known collectively as the First New Deal to meet with significant
opposition. Cutting was a voting but not debating member of this opposition and.he was certainly not one of its leaders. Moreover Cutting voted
with those who were more radical than was President Roosevelt and
Rapkoch's memo would place Cutting to the right of the President.
49. "Meanwhile F. D. Calls me up personally and most affectionately,
Dear Bron. or Brons, yet I know all the while he is urging on my colleagues
to unseat me." BMC-Phelps Putnam, Feb. 7, 1935,BMC Papers. .
50. BMGPutnam, Oct. 3, 1933. BMC Papers. Burns, Roosevelt, p.
202, also states the patronage in the state had been turned over to the
Democratic organization and not to the Cutting forces.
51. Ickes, Diary, vol. I, p. 27. It should be noted that the date on
this entry is April 26, 1933, very early in the FDR administration.
52. BMC-Putnam, March 21, 1934, BMC Papers.
53. FDR.-Edward M. House, Feb. 16, 1935, printed in Elliott Roosevelt, ed., FDR.-His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, vol. 1 (New York, 1950),
PP·45 2-53·
54. Huey Long quoted in "The Unofficial Observer," American
Messiahs (New York, 1935), p. 5.
55. John Heaton, Tough Luck-Hoover Again (New York, 1932),
P·91.
56. Ibid., p. 92.
57~ There is another possible reason for Roosevelt's OppoSItIOn to
Cutting. The President might not have been able to keep Democratic
support in New Mexico and elsewhere had he not supported the party's
nominee in New Mexico. This argument is, however, somewhat weakened
by Roosevelt's praise of Robert M. LaFollette, Jr. in his Senatorial campaign that year against Democratic opposition. See Roger T. Johnson,
Robert M. LaFollette, Jr. and the Decline of the Progressive Party in
Wisconsin (Madison, 1964), p. 33.
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to be noted ...
•1This is the last issue of NMHR to enjoy JOHN L. KESSELL'S services
as Assistant Editor. We wish him the best in his new position as research
historian with the National Park Service, but we shall miss him.
.~ Within the past year a number of useful reference works have been
published:
Latin America: A Guide to the Historical Literature. Edited by
Charles C. Griffen and J. Benedict Warren. Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1971. Pp. XXX, 700. Index. $25.00.
.Latin America, Spain, and Portugal: An Annotated Bibliography of
Paperback Books. Compiled by Georgette M. Dorn. Washington: Library
of Congress, 1971. Pp. iv, 180. Index. $.75.
National Directory of Latin Americanist5-1970. Hispanic Foundation
Bibliographical Series No. 12. Washington: Library of Congress, 1971.
Pp. iv, 684. Index. $4-95.
.
Latin American Scholarship Since World War II: Trends in History,
Political Science, Literature, Geography, and Economics. Edited by Roberto
Esquenazi-Mayo and Michael C. Meyer. Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1971. Pp. xi, 335. Bibliogs. $10.00.
The Cuban Revolution: A Research-Study Guide (1959-1969). By
Nelson P. Valdes and Edwin Lieuwen. Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1971. Pp. xii, 230. Index. Cloth, $7.50' Paper, $3.50'
A ClasSified Bibliography of the Periodical Literature of the T ransMississippi West: A Supplement (1957-67). By Oscar Osburn Winther and
Richard A. Van Orman. Bloomington and London: Indiana University
Press, 1970. Pp. xxv, 340. Index. $5.00.
Catalogue and Index of the Publications of the Hayden, King, Powell,
and Wheeler Surveys. By L. F. Schmeckebier. New Yark: Da Capo Press,
1971. Pp. vi, 208. (Original edition, Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1904.) $12.50'
Soldier and Brave: Historic Places Associated with Indian Affairs and
the Indian Wars in the Trans-Mississippi West. The National Survey of
Historic Sites and Buildings Vol. 12. New edition. Robert G. Ferris, Series
editor. Washington: National Park Service, 1971. Pp. xvi, 453. Illus.,
maps, index. $4.00.
My Dobie Collection. By Jeff Dykes. College Station, Texas: Texas
A & M University Press, 1971. Pp. viii, 44. Illus. $7.50'
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by Glennis Hinshaw and Lisabeth Lovelace. El Paso: El Paso Public
Library, 1971. Pp. x, 5+ Illus., index. $2.50'
American Indian Periodicals in the Princeton University Library: A
Preliminary List. By Alfred L. Bush and Robert S. Fraser. Princeton:
Princeton University Library, 1970. Pp. 78. $i.50~
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Taylor Forrest. New York: Teachers College Press, 1971. Pp. x, 56. Map.
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Pp. xi, 304. Index. $4.95.
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My GIRLHOOD AMONG OUTLAWS. By Lily Klasner, edited by Eve Ball.
Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1972. Pp. vii, 336. Illus.,
index. Cloth, $7.50' Paper, $4.95.
THIS BOOK is a very interesting one. The saga of the manuscript is also
very interesting. According to Eve Ball, author of In the Days of Victorio
and Ma'am Jones of the Pecos, Mrs. Klasner (1862-1946) planned to write
her autobiography and began collecting at an early age letters, documents,
and newspaper clippings related to her life and times. She collaborated
with her close friend, Sally Chisum Roberts, niece of John S. Chisum, in
regard to shared pioneer experiences. Maurice Garland Fulton, author of
History of the Lincoln County Wars, contracted with Mrs. Klasner to
organize and improve the manuscript, which he did. For reasons never
published he withdrew from the project. She, however, continued to work
on what she hoped would be a book. After Mrs. Klasner's death on May
31, 1946, the manuscript lay unnoticed for years in an old trunk in an
abandoned adobe house where it was found by her niece, Mrs. ala Casey
Jones. This was considered a literary event in the area and at the urging of
Maurice Fulton, Mrs. Ball undertook to edit the manuscript.
Lillian Klasner, the third child of Robert A. and Ellen E. Casey, was
born near Fort Mason in Mason County, Texas, in 1862. When she was
five years old the family moved to Rio Hondo in New Mexico, where
Robert Casey established two homes, operated a grist mill, ran a store, and
owned hundreds of range cattle. ,Mrs. Casey, eventually the mother of five
children, met every frontier demand with resourcefulness, courage, and
bravery. Lily Casey was also able to meet with courage and endurance
Indian' raids, epidemics, and, at the age of thirteen, the murder of her
father by the outlaw William Wilson. She says in regard to this tragedy:
"Edmund Welch brought the dreadful news that Father had been shot
that afternoon in Lincoln. Young as we were we had heard of killings so
frequently that we were able to take them as everyday events, but this time
.
it was our own dear father who was the victim."
Ash Upson, romantic newspaperman of the Old West, is realistically
and intimately presented as "Uncle Ash" who played such a major part
"in my young life as my first and most stimulating school teacher." Robert
Casey had hired Upson in 1872 to clerk in his store, and to teach in what
was commonly called the Casey School, an end room in one of the buildings on the Casey ranch.
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The author was too young at the time 6f the Lincoln County War to
give a firsthand account of it, but many details were given to her by
friends identified with it. The most important source materi~l she presents
is in the letters of Abneth McCabe, who had worked for John Chisum and
also for her father. The letters were written to her when she was in
Menard, Texas, fora term of school. She had met Billy the Kid when she
was a little girl. Other outlaws whom she knew were Jesse Evans, Charlie
Bowdre, TomO'Folliard, Billy Morton, and Dick Brewer. She knew Bob
Olinger, one of Billy the Kid's guards during his imprisonment who was
killed by Billy the Kid. She bitterly resented "the unfair picture of Olinger
as presented by Walter Noble Burns in his Saga of Billy the Kid." She
states: "In the face of the misrepresentation, I feel that the time has corne
to break a silence that I have kept for fifty years, and try to set a friend in
a true light." Mrs. Ball in a footnote to this chapter states that reportedly
Lily Casey and Bob Olinger were engaged to be married.
Mrs. Klasner presents in her book new material through John S.
Chisum's diary. Financial records revealing his great cattle interests
validate the reputation he had established. Very interesting too is the
specific description of the South Spring River Ranch which Chisum
owned, the most complete ranch property in eastern New Mexico.
The story of John S. Chisum's blighted romance as he told it to Lily
Casey is revealing. Readers may find it difficult to fit the highly sentimental
tale into the life story of the "Cattle King of the Pecos" until one recalls
the romantic aspects of Owen Wister's The Virginian, or Emerson Hough's
The Land of Heart's Desire. One realizes then that John Chisum belonged
to his age.
This is an important book and it is to be regretted that Mrs. Klasner
did not live to see its publication. At this late day the author may be
forgiven for taking such a prejudicial one-sided view of nearly all the
characters in the Lincoln County War who were associated with the
Murphy-Dolan side, while adopting as gospel truth everything their opponents said, and approving their actions. My Girlhood Among Outlaws
deserves a high place on' any list of books about Billy the Kid, John S.
Chisum, Pat Garrett, or the Lincoln County War. Eve Ball of Ruidoso is
to be commended for splendid work in salvaging the Klasner and Chisum
manuscripts and for her fine contribution to the history of the "Billy the
. " country.I
Kid

Albuquerque, N.M.

WILLIAM A. KELEHER and JULIA M. KELEHER
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SPANISH TEXAS: YESTERDAY AND TODAY. By Gerald Ashford. Austin and
New York: The Pemberton Press, 1971. Pp. viii, 296. Illus., bibliog;,
index. $7.50'
.
ALmOUGH Texas possesses a rich cultural heritage from Spain, particularly
from the eighteenth century, few scholars and laymen have devoted much
attention to it. Instead, writers have emphasized Texas' struggle for independence, her involvement in the war between the United States and
Mexico, and her development following the Compromise of 1850' Only
rarely has there appeared a book-length study of any portion of Spanish
administration of what was once Spain's frontera septentrional in the
Northeast.
Mr. Ashford, fine arts editor for the San Antonio Express-News, relates
in this work the familiar story of adventurers in Texas from Alvar Nunez
Cabeza de Vaca after 1528 to the arrival of Moses and Stephen Austin
about the time of Mexican independence in 1821. However, these three
centuries are marked by inconsistent Spanish interest in Texas; only the
last one shows any concerted effort toward establishing permanent Spanish
settlement in the region, and consequently experience with various problems becomes a major theme of the eighteenth century. The author spends
most of his time on the many expeditions that trekked across Texas and
the observations of foreign visitors (mostly illegal entrants). One-half of the
book treats the period before lasting occupation was accomplished; the
latter half begins with the settlement expedition of Captain Domingo de
Ram6n and St. Denis in 1716 and stresses the activities of the Marques de
Rubi, Philip Nolan, Zebulon Pike, and the numerous filibustering expeditions that dotted the two decades preceding Mexican independence from
Spain.
Although there are twenty short chapters comprising the text, only the
first eighteen provide continuity to the author's story, their organization
being strictly chronological. The final two, "Texas Heritage of Spanish
Law," and "Spanish Law in the Republic and State," are topical by nature
and focus on the institution of the legal heritage of Texas from Spain and
Mexico. They were published in professional journals earlier and seem out
of place here. Not only are they a marked change of pace from the rest of
the volume, but most of their subject matter deals with a period outside the
scope of the present work. In addition to the text, there are seven illustrations at the rear of the volume and an adequate index. However, there are
two serious deficiencies in the work. First, there are no maps whatsoever to
familiarize the reader with geographical features and location of places in
Texas. Second, not one footnote appears in the text, even for citation of
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direct quotations. The author does explain his major source materials in
his bibliography, organized by chapters. This section also shows his dependence upon secondary sources such as Carlos Castaneda's Our Catholic
Heritage in Texas (mistitled in the bibliography) and other published
accounts.
Basically, Spanish Texas is a study in political, military, ,and diplomatic
history intended for a limited market. It is not designed for scholars, but
even the general reader will have difficulty digesting its contents. There are
many annoying typographical errors, random accenting of Spanish names,
and even two blank pages (pp. 240-241) in this reviewer's copy. Mr.
Ashford is to be complimented for tackling an interesting, important subject,
and for accomplishing considerable research in available printed materials.
He has certainly opened the door for further research on the Spanish
experience in Texas. So have others before him. The real nagging problem
is that he has not gone beyond earlier efforts and he has not conclusively
proved his hypothesis that Spanish customs and institutions planted in the
eighteenth century are. the roots of the present Spanish tradition in Texas.
. Except for the land system and its. contributions, he has not examined the
structure of society, the colonial economy, and the administration of the
. province at all. In the end, this weakness, the failure to delve into primary
materials relating to the grassroots characteristics of Spanish society in
Texas, and the annoying mechanical drawbacks detract from the overall
value of the work for both general reader and the historian interested in
the real story of Spanish Texas.

U.S. Air Force Academy

. OAKAR L. JONES, JR.

FELIPE DE NEVE: FIRST GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA. By Edwin A. Beilharz.
San Francisco: California Historical Society, 1971. Pp. viii, 194. Apps.,
bibliog., index. $12.95.
THIS is a short monograph on the career of Felipe de Neve as Governor of
Alta California consisting of 137 pages of text and 33 pages of appendices
which contain English translations of the following documents: Neve's
service record; Viceroy Bucareli's instructions to Neve of September 30,
1774; Neve's comments on Father Serra in a lettt;r to Teodoro de Croix of
March 26, 1781; and Neve's instructio~s to Pedro Fages, his successor, of
September 7, 1782. Neve's actual title was Governor of. the Californias
but he was instructed to move the capital from Loreto in' Baja California
to Monterey in 1776 and to take personal charge of affairs in Alta Califor-
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nia. On these grounds Professor Beilharz labels him "first" governor of Alta
California although in fact three Spanish officials commonly called governor preceded him at Monterey.
.
There is no question that Felipe de Neve was a man of exceptional
importance in the history of California under Spain and this is a clearly
written account which does more than any previous study to bring scholarly
attention to bear on him. The work is based on Beilharz' doctoral dissertation entitled: "Felipe de Neve: Governor of California," done at the
University of California at Berkeley in 1951. What changes have been
made in the published work are mostly stylistic, although the author
provides more information on the family of Neve and makes some minor
factual alterations. He also attempts to bring the bibliography up to date.
It presents an impressive array of primary sources but nonetheless the
author seems to have missed some manuscript material in the Newberry
Library, the library of the University of Mexico, and the E. C. Barker
Texas History Center Library at the University of Texas. There are also
some gaps in the secondary sources such as Mario Hernandez Sanchez
Barba's La ultima expansiOn espanola en America (Madrid, 1957) and
Pablo L. Martinez, Historia de la Baja California (Mexico, n.d.) which
prints Neve's report on that province. In the bibliography of his original
dissertation the author provides references to an M.A. thesis by Mildred
G. Ahlf on Neve and an article on him by Lindley Bynum in the Historical Society of Southern California Publications, which have been
omitted from the printed version of the work.
Professor Beilharz states in his introduction that it is his intention to
rectify the unfavorable impression of Neve gained from Franciscan sources
championing Neve's redoubtable antagonist Father Junipero Serra. The
author says that these sources do Neve an injustice by not explaining what
lay behind Neve's actions. He disclaims any intention of championing
Neve, however, and states that it is simply his aim to "see him as he was."
The adjectives he applies to Father Serra, however, such as "wily," "cunning," with "the subtlety of the serpent," may not convince some readers
that he is particularly impartial in this celebrated controversy. What is
more, he does not follow his own recommendation of explaining what was
behind the alleged lack of cooperation and secretiveness of Father Serra
and the Franciscans when confronted by Neve's unsympathetic treatment.
.The author divides his study into topics by devoting a chapter each to
what he considers the major problems faced by Neve in California. The
chapter on frontier administration, for instance, takes up such problems as
Neve's mountain of correspondence with his superiors, which he had to
write himself; his administration of justice, especially his problems with
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unmarried soldiers who were apt to rape mission Indian girls; and other
similar matters. In chapters on finance, missions, the army, the Neve
reglamento or Regulations for Governing the Province of the Californias,
founding the towns of San Jose and Los Angeles, he discusses in some
detail these major concerns of the Governor. Neve, who was a typical
product of his age, with unusual administrative ability, treated Indians
with humanity, dealt roughly with missionaries, and did his impressive
best to build up population and food supplies in California by promoting
colonization and farming. His efforts were to be successful, although it can
hardly be said, as Beilharz does, that Neve solved the difficulties that
menaced California's existence. Many of those difficulties were still there
after Neve died, but he did make a determined attack on the problems he
encountered. The topical method of arranging his material provides reasonably thorough treatment for Professor Beilharz' major subjects but. it
has the disadvantage of repetition since most of the topics appear in all of
the chapters despite their headings.
As its subtitle implies, this work is limited to a study of Felipe de Neve
as Governor of Alta California. It is a pity that the author did not enlarge
upon his dissertation and discuss in d~tail the career of Neve in Queretaro,
Zacatecas, and Baja California before he became governor of Alta California and go on to consider his later brief career as commandant general of
the Interior Provinces. These aspects of Neve's 'life are barely touched
upon in the present study. There are a number of minor matters that
catch the attention in the work, one of them being the author's references
to the period of Mexican California as Spanish California (pp. 76, 84)
which is both confusing and misleading. In spite of its blemishes, however,
this work is a useful contribution to the history of California and it is to
be hoped that it will encourage the preparation of further studies which
will encompass the entire career of Felipe de Neve.

University of Virginia

C. ALAN HUTCHINSON

THE CHANGING PATTERN OF HoPI AGRICULTURE. By Maitland Bradfield.
London: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland,
1971. Pp. vi, 66. Illus., apps., maps. $6.60.
WHEN THE SOUTHWEST came under the custody of. the United States at
the mid-paint of the last century, the first order of business was that of
the exploration and assessment of this newly acquired region. The
consensus verdict concerning the Hopi and their domain was that these
friendly and industrious people were engaged in a hopeless struggle against
impossible odds. To individuals from the more verdant East, the Hopi
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country appeared to be a barren and desolate desert in which attempts at
agriculture or even human existence were futile. The corollary thought
was that these people were in evident decline and inevitably would become
extinct in at most a few decades, adding the ruins of their villages to the
numerous other monuments to failure which dotted the landscape. Hence,
most of the early proposals for aid to the Hopi had inherent in them the
idea that the most charitable act would be to remove them to a more
productive and less inhospitable environment.
These judgments underestimated grossly both the resourcefulness and
tenacity of the Hopi and the potential of their environment. To be sure,
theirs is an area in which direct precipitation alone is deficient for productive agriculture. But the local rainfall is augmented by runoff from higher
elevations, funneled to their vicinity by "washes" and springs. The water
supply was arrested and husbanded by ingenious measures, such as the
building of check dams, the erection of terraced gardens below the springs,
planting deeply in the soil down to moisture-retaining levels, and planting
on dunes and other accumulations of moisture-holding sand. These and
other practices enabled the Hopi to produce crops of corn, beans, pumpkins, cotton, and gourds. These are native American cultigens which have
become acclimatized to the arid Southwest through hundreds of years.
More remarkable is that a profusion of Old World domesticates which
were introduced during the Spanish mission period and later, and which
thus had no prior adaptation to this desiccated region, also have been
adopted quite readily into this specialized agricultural system. Among
these are wheat,peach, apricot, watermelon, cantaloupe, and a great
variety of vegetables and herbs.
The phenomenon of the delicate adjustment of Hopi agriculture to its
parsimonious environmental base has acted as a magnet,. drawing scholars
representing the varied disciplines upon which it impinges. In the volume
under review, Bradfield presents a quite thorough recapitulation and
appraisal of the findings of previous investigators. He tests these accumulated data against his own. field observations and the responses of informants to his interrogations. His field work, which was centered at the
westernmost village of Oraibi, was carried out during the years 1966
through 1970 and totaled about seven months. His results make it apparent that he worked with dedication and energy.
Initially, Bradfield set for himself only limited objectives, but the almost
inextricable interrelationships of various aspects of Hopi ecology. seduced
him into broader investigations, covering essentially the full spectrum of
habitat and agricultural practices. His interest in the factors which dictate
the location of fields led to the examination of historical geology, land
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forms, climate, soils, water supply, and zones of vegetation. His concern
with the effects of erosion on the reduction of arable land resulted in
excursions into the history of climatic cycles, the time of livestock intro~
ductions, effects of overgrazing, and Hopi verbal history. Likewise, his
looking into the inBuences of the introduction of more modem technology
lured him into stlldies of acculturation, population trends, modification of
land ownership patterns, and various effects manifested in the sociopolitical structure.
.
This broad array of data, along with its detailed analysis and interpretation, is compressed into a slender volume of just 66 pages. This product
will be of greater concern and value to specialists as a technical resource
than it will be to the general reader. The topically arranged text covers
only the first 37 pages, leaving the remaining almost one-half of the
volume for supporting and clarifying data in the form of copious notes, a
post~cript, four appendices, bibliography, twelve plates, and two large
folding maps. The volume is generally free of errors and blemishes, is
attractively prepared, and reBects a good level of scholarship. The two
large folding maps are so bulky and heavy as to put a severe strain on the
pocket and the paper cover. At ten cents per printed page, the volume
seems somewhat overpriced.
The agriculture of the Hopi has become a classic example of subsistence
farming under minimal environmental conditions. Bradfield demonstrates
that the pattern is becoming highly modified and reduced by environ~
mental and cultural changes. Those factors and the increasing adoption
by the Hopi of the pervading commercial economy are bringing the native
pattern close to extinction. It would seem that the subject deserves full
exposition of the scope and style of the volumes by Edward F. Castetter
and Willis H. Bell on Pima and Papago Indian Agriculture and on ¥uman
Indian Agriculture (University of New Mexico Press, 1942 and 1951
respectively). Such a project would consist primarily of organization of
data and composition, as most of the necessary research has been accomplished. Bradfield has made a notable contribution toward this end by
providing a mine of detailed information.

University of Michigan

VOLNEY H. JONES

How THE U.S. CAVALRY SAVED OUR NATIONAL PARKs. By H. Duane
Hampton. Bloomington/London: Indiana University Press, 1971. Pp.
viii, 246. IIIus., bibliog., index. $8.95.
.
HOLLYWOOD FILMMAKERS and Western history buffs have often romanticized the U.S. Cavalry. Professional historians have sometimes refused
to take the cavalry seriously. This solid monograph takes the Army seriously
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indeed. It deals with the role of the cavalry in administering Yellowstone,
Yosemite, and Sequoia National Parks during the late 19th century and
early 20th century, and it leaves no doubt that the Army performed an
essential public service in undertaking the protection of these scenic
preserves at a time when no other governmental agency was able to do so.
From 1886 to 1918 in Yellowstone, and for shorter periods in Yosemite
and Sequoia, the U.S. Cavalry patrolled the park borders, chased away
poachers, built roads, and generally demonstrated its competence in dealing
with some of the most difficult problems in park administration.
Professor Hampton makes a case that Army officers, rather than civilian
superintendents, originated many of the modern-day park policies we take
for granted. It was the Army, he argues, that had the institutional stamina
to fight off the politicians who wanted to exploit the parks. It was the
Army, he contends, that had the independence to resist local developmental
pressures and the inventiveness to find extralegal ways, if necessary, to
punish destructive frontiersmen and park visitors. He even asserts that
the beginnings of the National Park Service interpretive programs may
be traced to the simple act of Army troopers answering tourists' questions.
The National Parks were in need of help when the U.S. Cavalry came
to the rescue. Established in I 872, Yellowstone was largely unorganized
and unprotected under its first civilian superintendents. In 1886 the
Secretary of the Interior finally bowed to political reality (no appropriations for park administration) and called in the Army. This was thought to
be a temporary arrangement, but the troops stayed in Yellowstone until
1918. They were in Yosemite and Sequoia until about the same time. In
all three parks the Army's record was generally good. To claim, as the
author does, that the Army "saved" these parks is perhaps a small exaggeration, but his main point is undeniable, namely, that the U.S. Army
played a central part in the early history of the national parks and contributed significantly to their administration and development.
The book is based on thorough research in the Yellowstone National
Park Archives, the National Archives, public documents, and pertinent
secondary sources. The chapters on Yellowstone are the best part of the
book. The section on Captain George S. Anderson, the acting superintendent of Yellowstone in the early 1890'S, is particularly interesting. But
the book may be criticized on several grounds. First, the author reaches a
little too far in identifying precedent-setting actions by the Army. The
Park Service interpretive programs, for example, sprang more from the
public relations concerns of Steve Mather and Horace Albright than from
the efforts of the Army. Second, the narrative gets bogged down occasionally in detailed discussions of legislative debates affecting Yellowstone

395

BOOK REVIEWS

Park; this tends to shift the focus to Congressional politics and away from
the Army's work in the park. Third, the author avoids dealing with the
parks that were in existence before 1918 but were never administered by
the Army, such as Mount Rainier, Glacier, and Crater Lake. Clearly the
Army did not "save" these parks in quite the same sense as in Yellowstone,
Yosemite, and Sequoia.
These criticisms are not intended to detract from the author's achievement. The book fills a significant gap in the history of the national parks
and isa valuable addition to the lengthening list of scholarly books on
conservation history. The bibliography is excellent.
University

of California, Davis

THE BRACERO PROGRAM:

DONALD

C.

SWAIN

INTEREST GROUPS AND FOREIGN POLICY. By

Richard B. Craig. Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1971.
Pp. xviii, 233. Bibliog., index. $7.50'
THIS BOOK, which was apparently a doctoral dissertation and bears some of
the stigmata" of that genre, is on the whole a comprehensive and worthwhile study of the history of the bracero question over the last third of
the century, although I had some difficulty with Dr. Craig's English style,
which tends to the rococo, with an awkwardness and an occasional inexactness in the use of words. Dr. Craig's interpretations of events are
generally intelligent and informed, although on occasion alternative
explanations that are equally plausible and account equally well for the
evidence are not examined. The only point on which I would seriously
disagree with his interpretations is his condemnation of the agricultural
policies of the Mexican government without examining those policies
carefully, especially in view of the constraints under which Mexican
governments necessarily had to operate, and the benefits which those
policies did in fact bring to the country.
The author draws on quite" a variety of sources-United States and
Mexican newspapers, monographs, government reports, Congressional
hearings and debates-and manages to bring to bear discussion of a very
wide range of factors" that prove to be relevant to the evolution of policy
on the bracero question. Thus he examines the influence of such disparate
orders of reality as United States politics, Mexican economic problems,
agricultural conditions in the Southwest~ diplomatic practice, bureaucratic
infighting, and legal conventions. This versatility of approach is one of
the strongest features of the book.
On the whole, Dr. Craig knows what he is talking about as he moves
from one level of the problem to another, especially when dealing with its
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political aspects. It is a fascinating story, in which a shifting balance of
political pressures is shown to shape the evolution of the bracero program.
For Mexico the program was valuable primarily as a source of foreign
exchange and as a safety valve for the surplus agricultural population,
although it also had many subsidiary benefits, such as changes in the
knowledge and attitudes of the returning braceros. At the same time, the
program was politically rather embarrassing because it demonstrated that
many Mexicans were not being adequately employed within the country
and/or preferred life in the United States; moreover, incidents of discrimination and poor treatment of the bracero in the United States provided
repeated hurts to national dignity.
On the United States side, the principal pressures were from the
growers, who of course supported the program, and from organized labor,
which opposed it because of its depressive effect on employment and
wages of U.S. nationals. Conditions of labor shortage during World War II
and the Korean War, together with the desire of Mexico for the program,
tipped the political balance in favor of the growers until the program was
discontinued in I~4. But the growers did not have things all their own
way. As Dr. Craig indicates, although the growers were stronger in
Congress, organized labor managed to use its influence with the Secretary
of Labor to gain some of its demands through administrative rulings, and
he points out that the fringe benefits granted the braceros by treaty created
anomalies that proved a stimulus for legislation to improve the lot of
domestic farm workers.
This part of the story leads, in his otherwise very good final chapt~r, to
Craig's conclusion, which for my taste is a little too sanguine, that the
power of special business interests, acting especially through the undemocratic power structure of the Congress, "should not be cause for undue
alarm." That may be so, but to me, even after reading this worthwhile
book, the influence of special interests in the decision-making process
remains cause for quite a bit of "due alarm." The bracero program did
some good, in various ways, on both sides of the border; but that it did so
was, from the point of view of the public interest on the U.S. side, a
fortunate accident rather than constituting some kind of validation of the
processes by which, through the push and tug of special interests, decisions
were made.

The University of New Mexico

MARTIN

C.

NEEDLER
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139,143,145,215,220
Embudo, N.M., 34
Ernest, Fine, 197
Eubanks, Lt. W., 26
Eulate, Juan de, 1I7
Falces, Marques de, viceroy, 86
Farmers' Holiday Assoc., 347, 366
Farmington Times-Hustler, 346
Fernandez, Carlos, 125, 127-29
Findlay, Capt., 9
First New Mexico Reservoir and
Irrigation Co., 306
Fitzpatrick, Thomas, 36
Flathead Indians, 266
Floods, 222, 301-02, 305, 312, 313, 314
Flores Mogoll6n, Juan Ignacio, 1I8, 119
Flour, 42, 160, 213-38
Floyd, John B., 228
Fondo legal, defined, 94, 98, 99; of
presidios, 101. See also Municipalities.
Fontana, Bernard L., bk. rev. by, 293-94
Ft. Bascom, 190
Ft. Bliss, 222, 223, 224, 231
Ft. Breckinridge, 231
Ft. Buchanan, 223, 228, 230,231
Ft. Butler, 228
Ft. Craig, 229, 230, 231
Ft. Defiance, 33, 229, 241, 244,247
Ft. Fauntleroy, 231
Ft. Fillmore, 221,223,231
Ft. Garland, 230,231
Ft. Huachuca, 239, 247
Ft. Leavenworth, 5-10 passim, 23, 24,
214,215,220,223,227
Ft. Massachusetts, 43, 231
Ft. Stanton, 230, 231
Ft. Thorn, 223, 231
Ft. Union, 33, 42, 166,192, 194,
195-97,216,223,224,225,229,230 .
Ft. Webster, 222

Ft. Wingate, 246, 247,253, 254
Franklin, see EI Paso
Frazer, Robert W., Purveyors of Flour
to the Army: Department of New
Mexico, 1849-1861,213-38
Freemasonry, 185
Fremont, John c., 36
French, in N.M., 51, 53
Funk, Joseph, 51
Fur Trade, 51, 152
Furlong, Lt. B. F., 26
Gabald6n, Juan de, 132
Galisteo Basin, 1I6, 1I8
Galvez, Jose de; 91
Garrett, Pat, 303-05, 306, 309
Geise, Capt., II, 15
Giddings, Marsh, 189
Gila River, 215
G6mez del Castillo, Francisco, 122, 124,
125, 127
G6niez del Castillo, Juan, 124-25
Gonzalez Baz, Juan, 122
Goodman, Henry, 196
Goodnight, Charles, 161-62, 164
Goodrich, James W., Revolt at Mora,
1847,49-60
Gordon, Maj. William H., 39, 41-43
Grant County, 200
Grayson, Col. John, 222-24
Green, Henry M., 229
Green, John M., 231
Greene, Charles W., 304-05, 306
Greenhorn grant, see Cuerno Verde
Greiner, John, 43
Griego, Francisco (Pancho), 191-92
Grier, Maj. William, 37-39
Guadalupe Hidalgo, Treaty of, 152,
154,158,185-86,214
Guerin, Fran~ois, 218
Guillen, Ursula, 127
Gypsum, 307, 312, 314
Haciendas, 87-88, 105, 1I6
Hagerman, James John, 304-06, 309-11
Hamilton, Capt. John L., 14
Hamilton, Lt. R. N., 26
Hampton, Capt. James, 9, 12,26
Hannett, A. T., 361
Hanson, Pvt. John, 196
Harding County, 364

INDEX
Hart, Simeon, 215, 220-24, 227, 231
Hart's Mill, 220
Harvey, Pvt. Anthony, 196
Hatch, Carl, 318, 321-22, 365
Hawkins, Lt. John, 22
Haynie, Lt. I. M., 26
Hays, Col. Jack c., 215
Hefron, Gus, 196
Hendley, Capt. Israel R., 52-55
Hensley, H. B., 339
Hernandez, B. C., 362
Hersch, Joseph, 218, 225-26, 227, 228,
230,231
Hicks, Lt. C., 26
Hicks, Lt. R. E., 26
Hinkle, J. F., 312
Hohokam, 136-37
Holbrook, Joseph, 196
Holleman, Reed, 362
Homesteading, 1'88, 307, 364
Hondo Reservoir, 302, 303, 306-13
Hook, Capt. George W., 7, 9, 10, 12,
22,24,26
Hooper, Lt., 25
Hopi Indians, 129, 239-56
Horses, 213
Hovey, Oliver P., 229,231
Hudgins, Pvt. John, 54
Hundertmark, C. A, Reclamation in
Chaves and Eddy Counties,
1887-1912,301-16
Hundley, Lt. R. M., 26
Hunt, Lt. J. M., 26
Hutchinson, C. Alan, bk. rev. by, 389-91
Illinois Volunteers in New Mexico,
1847-1848, by Lee Myers, 5-31
ILLUSTRATIONS: Mounted volunteer, 4;
Blizzard, 25; Rancho, 44; Watermark,
63; Irrigating, 84; Acequia madre,
Santa Fe, facing 144, Irrigation ditch
and floodgate, facing 144; Boundary
marker, 175; Dead town, Hopi, 212;
Mexican mill, 232; Navajo "gristmill,"
238; Group of Hopi, 250; Stampede,
282; McMillan Dam, facing 301
Indian agents, 239-56
Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, by
Gary C. Stein, 257-70
Indian Rights Assoc., 258, 262
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Indians, citizenship, 257-70; hostilities,
13, 18-21,33-44 passim, 51, 53, 57,
90, 156; labor, 113, 138-39; land,
85-134 passim; population, 87-88;
treaties, 18, 21. See also individual
groups.
Indian schools, 249-53
Indian Truth, 262
Intendancy system, 90-92, 101, 102, 105
Irrigation, 99,100,116, 119; Spanish,
135-50; Pecos Valley, 301-16
Jacona, pueblo, 117,118, 120-21, 130
Jemez, pueblo, 115,145-46
Jenkins, Myra Ellen, Spanish Land
Grants in the Tewa Area, 113-34
Jesup, Gen. Thomas S., 223
Jicarilla Apache Indians, 37, 41
Jironza Petris de Cruzate, Domingo,
114, 115-16
Johnson, Lt. A H., 26
Johnson, Thomas S. J., 217
Johnston, Col. Joseph E., 228
Jones, Capt. Augustus, 8
Jones, Oakah L. Jr., bk. rev. by, 388-89
Jones, Volney H., bk. rev. by, 391-93
Juez de aguas, 141
Julian, George W., 174
Kansas, 6, 9, 23,155
Keams Canyon, Ariz., 249, 252
Kearny, Gen. Stephen Watts, 34, 49,
226; Code, 152
Keith, Lt. G. A, 26
Keithley, Levi, 52
Keleher, William A, and Julia M., bk.
rev. by, 386-87
Kendrick, Maj. H. L., 41-42
Kern, Dr. Benjamin, 36
Kinman, Capt. William, 9, 16, 26
Kinney, Capt. Thomas B., 7, 10, 16,26
Kiowa Indians, 35,43
Knight, Lt. J. A, 26
Korpony, Capt. Gabriel de, 15, 22, 25
Labor, New Spain, 113; political role,
326-27, 331, 347, 349, 366. See also
Labor Commissioner.
Labor Commissioner, N.M., 323, 324-27,
339-42
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Lacy, J. W., 193
Laguna, pueblo, 94, ll5, ll6
La Joya, see Velarde
Lake Arthur, 304
La Landa, Tomas Benito, 154, 166
Land grants, 85-134, 135-50 passim,
151-202
Lands, public, 308, 331, 364, 366
Lane, Col., 17
Las Animas grant, see Vigil and St.
Vrain
Las Ciruelas, see Atrisco
Las Vegas Daily Optic, 172
Las Vegas Optic, 340
Las Vegas, N.M., 14, 16, 18,20,21,
23,37,51, 52,53,228
Ledoux, Epifanio, 169-73
Leal, James W., 33
Lee, Stephen Luis, 33,151-52,153,154
Lee, William D., 198
Lee and Beaubien grant, 153-54, 155,
157-59
Lemitar, N.M., 16
Lemmon, Theodore G., 239, 252
Leonard, J. 1., 309
Limantour, Jose Y., 103
Lincoln County, 185, 195, 198,200,
303,309
Linny, Navajo Indian, 241-48
Liquor, 15,41
Little Colorado River, 136
"Little Texas," 368, 372
Livestock, 14, 25, 35, ll5-34 passim,
141, 145-46; stealing, 13, 18,20.
See also Cattle, Cows, Horses, Oxen,
Sheep.
Logan, John Alexander, 26
Long, Leslie M., 306
Longwill, Robert H., 186, 191-95 passim
Lopez, Carlos, ll9
Lopez, Luis, 130
Los Esteros Dam, 302, 314
Los Lunas, N.M., 231
Lovato, Eugenio, 156
Lovato, Juan Jose, 123
Loving, Oliver, 161
Lucero, Antonio Maria, 154, 165
Lucero, Marcos, 124-27
Luckey, Lt. E., 24, 26
Lujan, Juana, 122, 123, 124, 125

Lumber, 216
Luna family, 226
Lundry, Lt. S., 26
Lynch, Mathew, 193
Madison, Lt. R., 22, 26
Madrid, Matias, 120-23, 125
Maes, Juan de Dios, 52
Mail service, 10, 25, 49, 224
Maize, 42, 128, 130, 131, 156,213-38
passim
Manning, Van H., 174
Malpais Ranch and Trading Co., 239
Mansfield, Col. Joseph K. F., 217, 227,
228
Manuelito, Navajo leader, 246
Manzano, N.M., .143
Marais, Michele des, 228
Marcy, William 1., 6,14,17,19
Marin del Valle, Francisco Antonio, 124
Marmon, Robert G., 167-68, 188
Marshall, Lt. B. F., 26
Martin, Sebastian, 123
Martinez, Jose Antonio, 42
Mascaro, Manuel, 100
Matchett, W. B., 199
Maxwell, Lucien B., 161, 188
Maxwell Land Grant, 170, 191,197,
199. See also Beaubien and Miranda.
Maxwell Land Grant and Railway Co.,
168,173,188,192
May, John, 225
McCall, Col. George A., 40, 216, 228
McCarty, Isaac, 219
McCullough, John, 196
McDowell, Lt. T., 26
McGaffey, 1. K., 309
McKamey, Lt. Thomas c., 53-55
McMains, Oscar Patrick, 168, 170, 171,
172, 173, 193-94
McMillan Dam, 30 I, 314
McMillan Lake, 304
McMillan Reservoir, 307, 310, 313, 314
McNair, Capt. Charles A., 14
McPherson, Mary E., 199-200
Meira, Maurice, 362, 364, 365
Mendoza, Antonio de, viceroy, 86
Mendoza, Gaspar Domingo de, 115
Mendoza, Juan Domingo de, 123, 131
Mermod, Arthur A., 304

INDEX
Merritt, Charles H., 217
Mesa Verde, 137
Mestas, Antonio, 124
Mestas, Juan de, 119, 120, 121
Methodist Episcopal Church, 194
Methodists, 168, 191, 193,250
Mestizos, land, 89, 106
Mexican War, 5-31,49,154,214,220
Mexico, colonial, 85-112; imports from,
222, 223; Independence, 90, 106-07;
land laws, 152-54, 158, 159, 164, 172;
naturalization, 151
Meyer, Lipman, 218
Miles, John E., 347, 364, 367
Miller, Jaffa, 364
Mills, MelvinW., 61-62, 169, 171, 172,
192, 194
Mills, 213-38
Mineral rights, Spanish, 85
Mining, labor, 113
Miranda, Guadalupe, 151,188
Mishongovi, pueblo, 252
Missions, Protestant, 250-51; Catholic,
251
Missouri Volunteers, 5-31 passim, 33-35,
51-56 passim, 220
Mr. Catron's Ill-humored Cow, 61-63
Mitchell, Daniel Holmes, An Indian
Trader's Plea for Justice, 1906,239-56
Montezuma Well National Monument,
136
Montoya, Andres, 123
Montoya, Joseph, 322
Montoya, Pablo, 50
Moore, Capt. Francis, 196
Moore, Lt. John C., 217
Mora, N.M., 33,49-57, 166,219,229
Mora County, 155, 168, 169
Mora grant, 154,155,166,169,172
Morey, Lt. A. V., 26
Modi, fray Juan Agustin, 104-05
Morin, Capt. Jesse I., 56
Morley, Ada McPherson, 193, 199-200
Morley, William R., 191, 192-93,
196-97
Mormons, 187-88, 190-91, 199
Moses, Capt. John c., 10, 16,26
Mountain Meadows Massacre; 189
Municipalities, Spanish colonial, 86, 87,
97-104; N.M., 93-94, 116, 138-41
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Munroe, Col. John, 39-42 passim
Murphy, Lawrence G., 195
Murphy, Lawrence R., The United
States Army in Taos, 1847-1852,
33-48
Myers, Lee, Illinois Volunteers in New
Mexico, IS47-184S, 5-31
Nambe, pueblo, 47,115, ll7, llS, 119,
130, 131
National Recovery Administration, 349,
365
Nava, Pedro de, 101
Navajo Indians, 14, 16, IS-21 , 239-56
Needler, Martin c., bk. rev. by, 395-96
New Deal, 321-81 passim
New Mexico, Hispanic counties, 369;
Indian precincts, 373, 374; Mexican
land grants, 151-84; Senate election,
1934,317-81; Spanish land grants,
85-150
New Mexico State Tribune, 340
New York Times, 331-32, 345, 351
New Placers, N.M., 165
New Spain, see Mexico
Newby, Col. Edward W. B., 7, 9-24
passim, 26
Newell, Frederick H., 307
Newlands Act of 1902, 306
Newman, Simeon Harrison, 191
Niles, Capt. Franklin, 9, 10, 26
Nolan, Gervacio, 151-84
Nolan, N.M., 174
Northern Canal, 304, ~06, 3ll, 312
Ocate Creek, 166, 169
Oil Assoc., 366
Ojeda, Bartolome, 115
Onate, Juan de, 113, 117, 138
Oraibi, pueblo, 252
Orcasitas, Jose de, 122
Ortiz, Antonio Jose, 126
Ortiz, Tomas, 50
Ortiz family, grant, 131
Ortiz y Alarid, Gaspar, 218
Ordenanzas para los nuevas
descubrimientos, 1573,86, 100, 114,
138
Ordinances of 1573, see Ordenanzas
Oregon Trail, 6, 8
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Otero, Antonio Jose, 225, 226-27, 229,
231,232
Otero, Miguel A., 363
Owens, Lt. Jones H., 53
Oxen, 129, 143
Oyu,120
Paez Hurtado, Juan, II9, 120, 122-23,
130
Pajarito Canyon, 123, 125
Palen, Joseph G., 186, 191, 197
Palmer, Gen. William Jackson, 162
Papago Indians, 137
Pecos, pueblo, 115
Pecos Irrigation Co., 301, 305, 310-11,
312
Pecos Irrigation and Improvement Co.,
305,306
Pecos Irrigation and Investment Co.,
304,306
Pecos River, 301, 302, 308, 314
Pecos Valley, settlement (1887-1912),
301-16
Pecos Valley and Northeastern Railway
Co., 309
Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy
District, 312
Pecos Valley Land and Ditch Co., 304
Pelaez, Jacinto, 120
Penitentes, 368
People of the Territory of New Mexico
vs. the Santa Fe Ring, by Philip J.
Rasch, 185-202
Pelham, William, 154, 155, 157-58,
160, 166
Peralta, Pedro de, 138
Peralta, N.M., 225, 226
Perez, Albino, 154
Perry, Reuben, 239-48, 253
Pickens, William H., 317-35; Cutting
vs. Chavez: A Reply to Wolf's
Comments, 337-59
Picuris, pueblo, 115
Pima Indians, 137
Pinkerton, William, 167, 168, 169-74
Pinkerton vs. Ledoux, 169-74
Piro Indians, 137
Pitic, Plan of, 1789, 97-104
Pitic, Villa de San Pedro de la Conquista
de, 98,102

Poe, John W., 308, 309
Pojoaque, pueblo, II5, II7, 118, II9-21,
130
Polygamy, 189
Ponett, Ola, 51
Ponil Creek, 191, 194
Populism, 309, 329
Possession, Act of, 96, 153-54
Pratt, John, 193
Pratte, Bernard, 218
Presidios, 97; Land and water rights,
90,96,101; Regulations, 98
Price, Gen. Sterling,S, II, 13, 14, 16-19,
21-22,23, 34, 49~50, 53, 55,220
Probert, Alan, bk. rev. by, 72-75
Progressives, 265,266-67,268-70,
341,344-51
Protectors of the Indians, 119, 120,
125, 127
Provincias Internas, 90,92, 94, 96, 100,
102, 105, 106
Provost, Lt. J. 1.,26
Pruett, Benjamin, 51
Public works, 344, 349
Pueblo, Colo., 162
Pueblo County, Colo., 160, 163
Pueblo Fort, 152
Pueblo Indians, 38,40,41,44,50,
113-50 passim, 190, 213
Pueblo League, 114-34 passim
Pueblo Revolt of 1680, 114, 116, II7,
139
Pueblo Rights Doctrine, 103-04
Pulley, Lt. D. R., 26
Purge that Failed, The: The 1934
Senatorial Election in New Mexico:
Yet Another View, by G. 1.
Seligmann, Jr., 361-81
Quir6s, Joseph, 119
Rae! de Aguilar, Alfonso, 96, 120, 130
Ralls, Col. John, 23, 220
Ransom, Capt. Robert Jr., 43
Rapkoch, Peter, 363, 374, 375
Rasch, Philip J., The People of the
Territory of New Mexico vs. The
Santa Fe Ring, 185-202
Raton Comet, 168
Rayado, N.M., 38,40, 158

INDEX
Rayado Grant, see Beaubien and
Miranda
Rayado River, 37
Real del Oro, N.M., 151, 165
Rebellion of 1696, 118
Reclamation Extension Act of 1914, 308
Reclamation in Chaves and Eddy
Counties, 1887-1912, by C. A
Hundertmark, 301-16
Reclamation Service, 301-16 passim
Reconstruction Finance Corp., 348
Recopilaci6n de leyes de los Reynos de
las Indias, 85-112 passim, 117, 139-40,
144
Red River, 166; 169. See also Rio
Colorado.
Reed, Capt. Henry J., 10, 12, 26
Reed, Wendell Monroe, 307, 308
Reese, Calvin L., bk. rev. by, 294-96
Regidores, 94
Relief programs, 344, 348, 366
Republican Party, 174, 185, 189, 265,
268-69, 309, 317-81
Revillagigedo, Conde de, viceroy, 105
Revolt at Mora, 1847, by James W.
Goodrich, 49-60
Reynold, Maj. William W., 20, 34
Reynolds, Capt. Alexander W., 217, 225
Richardson, G. A, 309
Richardson, Lt. H., 26
Riley, Carroll L., bk. revs. by, 66-68
Riley, John H., 195
~nehart, Isaiah, 195, 196
Rio Arriba County, 364, 367
Rio Chiquito, 225
Rio Colorado, N.M., 33, 36, 37, 39,43
Rio de Dolores, see Don Carlos River
Rio Felix, 301
Rio Grande, 5, 15,34,36, 117,135-50
passim, 215, 301, 308; 1856 flood, 222
Rio Grande del Rancho, 219
Rio Grande Valley, 18; 116
Rio Hondo, 301, 303, 304, 306
Rio Hondo Reservoir Water Users'
Assoc., 308-11
Rio Penasco, 301
Robertson, A. M.,309
Rodey, Bernard S., 307-08
Rodriguez Cubero, Pedro, 117, 118-19,
120, 121-22, 130 ...
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Romeu, Capt. Joseph Antonio, 101 .
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 317-81 passim
Roosevelt, Theodore, letter to, 239-56
Roper, Lt. J. B., 26 .
Roswell,N.M., 302-16 passim
Roswell Register, 308
Royall, Lt. William B., 22
Roybal, Ignacio, 119,120-21, 123
Safford, Ed, 363
St. Charles River, 160
St. Vrain, Ceran, 42, 151,153,156,
216-20, 224-32
Salas, Antonio de, 117
Salas, Sebastian, 118
Salt Lake Herald, 190
Salt Lake Trib·une, 189-90
Salvatierra, Conde de, viceroy, 88
San Crist6bal, pueblo, 117-18
San Elizario, post, 221, 225, 230, 231
San Felipe, pueblo, 15-16, 115
San Francisco del Tuerto, N.M., 165
San Francisco v. The United States,
1864,103
San Gabriel, N.M., 116, 138
San Ildefonso, pueblo, 115, 117,118,
120-29, 131, 137
San Isidro (Pojoaque), 118
San Jose River, N.M., 137
SanJuan, pueblo, 115,117,118,138,
145
San Juan County, 364
San Juan de los Caballeros, N.M., 116
San Lazaro, pueblo, 117-18
San Luis Potosi, Intendancy, 92, 105
San Luis Valley, 36,37,43, 153
San Miguel County, 168, 192,367,368;
Penitente precincts, 370
San Miguel de Horcasitas, presidio, 98
Sanchez, Jose Miguel, 153
Sanchez, Pedro, 123-24, 126
Sanchez,'Pedro, 195
Sanchez Vanares Tagle, Isidro, 95
Sandia, pueblo, 116
Sandoval Martinez, Miguel de, 119
Sangre de Cristo Grant, see Lee and
Beaubien
Sangre de Cristo Mountains, 35-36, 37,
51, 153, 165
Santa Barbara, N.M., 225
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Santa Clara, pueblo, 1I7, 1I8, 121-22,
127-29
Santa Clara Grant, see Nolan, Gervacio
Santa Cruz de la Canada, N.M., 34, 1I5,
117-18,120,122,123,131,139,145
Santa Cruz de Rosales, Chih., 18,220,
222, 223, 227
Santa Cruz River, 1I7, 1I8
Santa Fe, N.M., 6-25 passim, 50, 51,
1I6, 121,225; cabildo, 95, 138;
irrigation, 138-39; mail service, 224;
mills, 215, 216-18
Santa Fe County, 364
Santa Fe New Mexican, 185,304, 340,
362, 363
Santa Fe Railroad, 62-63, 167, 174
Santa Fe Republican, II, 12, 15, 16, 19,
21-23,214
Santa Fe Ring, 152, 168, 169, 185-202
Santa Fe River, 139,216
Santa Fe Trade, 51,218-19
Santa Fe Trail, 5-31 passim
Santa Fe Weekly New Mexican, 194-95
Santa Rosa, N.M., 302
Santo Domingo, pueblo, 115
Saunders, Abe, 198
Schmitt, Martin, bk. rev. by, 77
Scholes, Walter V., bk. rev. by, 288-89
Schroeder, Albert H., bk. rev. by, 285-86
Schwarz, Carl E., bk. rev. by, 77-78
Scolly, John, 172
Seligman, Arthur, 361-62,375
Seligmann, G. L., Jr., 338, 341, 345,
346; The Purge that Failed: The
1934 Senatorial Election in New
Mexico: Yet Another View, 361-81
Sena, Bernardino, 130
Sena, Tomas, 130
Shawnee Indians, 9
Sheep, 167,226,239
Sibley, Capt. Caleb G, 7
Simmons, Marc, 92, 93; Spanish
Irrigation Practices in New Mexico,
135-50; bk. rev. by, 284-85
Simms, Albert, 362
Simms, Ruth Hanna McCormick, 361,
362
Simpson, Jerry, 309
Sioux Indians, 263
Siqueiros, Leonardo, 220

Small, Pvt. George, 196
Smith, Duane A., bk. rev. by, 71
Smith, Dwight L., bk. rev. by, 290-91
Smith Isaiah, 226
Smithson, Capt. Benjamin W., 14
Snyder, Homer P., 257-67 passim
Socorro, N.M.', 14, 16, 1I6
Socorro County, 367
Sonnichsen, G L., bk. rev. by, 75-76
Sonora, 97, 222
South Pueblo, Colo., 162
Spanish Irrigation Practices in New
Mexico, by Marc Simmons, 135-50
Speaks, Pvt. John, 55
Spiegelberg, Solomon J., 225
Springer, Charles, 339-41
Springer, Frank, 173, 192, 193, 196-99
Stein, Gary G, The Indian Citizenship
Act of 1924, 257-70
Stein, John, 225
Stevens, Benjamin, 195-97
Stevens, Joseph, 304
Stockton, Capt. David D., 20
Sullivan, V. I., 310
Sumner, Col. Edwin Vose, 42, 217, 221,
224-27
Swain, Donald G, bk. rev. by, 393-95
Swazzkopf, Debus and Co., 229, 231
Tafoya, Felipe, 124-25
Taliaferro, Theodore W., 228
Talpa, N.M., 219
Tameling, Johri G., 163-64
Tano pueblos, 1I7-18, 139
Taos, N.M., 14, 19,33-48, 151-52,198,
219,224-25
Taos, pueblo, 34-35, 38, 50, 94, 106,
190, 198
Taos County, 155,194-95
Taos Rebellion of 1847, 5, 33, 49-57
passim, 154
Taos Valley, 39, ll6, 219
Taos Volunteers, 37
Tapia, Maria de, ll9
.
Taylor, Morris F., The Two Land Grants
of Gervacio Nolan, 151-84
Taylor, Lt. Oliver H. P., 39
Tebay, Lt.'T., 26
Tecolote, N.M., 53
Tenorio de Alva, Miguel, 1I9

INDEX
Territory of New Mexico vs. The Nolan
Grant, 169
Tesuque, pueblo, 115, 117, 118, 130,
132
Tewa Indians, 113-34
Texas, 105, Dept. of, Army posts, 222,
227; Secession, 230
Tingley, Clyde, 347, 361-62, 365
Tipton, Will N., 116
Tolby, F. J., 191, 195
Tolby, Thomas, see Tolby, F. J.
Tomasito, Pueblo leader, 50
Tracy, Francis G., 305, 310
Traders, to Indians, 239-56
Trafzer, Clifford E., ed., An Indian
Trader's Plea for Justice, 1906,239-56
Trauer, Samuel S., 192
Trias, Angel, 17, 18
Trinchera Creek, 37
Trujillo, Antonio, 119
Trujillo, Bahasar, 119, 122, 126
Trujillo, Jose, 121, 131
Trujillo, Juan, ]]8-19
Trujillo, Mateo, 121-22
Turner, Capt. Van Trump, 9, 12, 22,
24-26
Turney, Dr. Daniel, 15
Two Land Grants of Gervacio Nolan, by
Morris F. Taylor, 151-84

Ulibarri, Juan de, 95
Una de Gato Grant, 199
United States, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
239,255,261,266,268,269;
Congress, 155, 156, 158-65, 173,
186-87,189,257-70,302,308,317-81
passim; Constitution, 343; Interior
Dept., 170, 188, 189, 199,259,260,
266, 267, 268, 307, 308; Supreme
Court, 131, 162-63, 171, 172-73, 188,
189; Surveyor General, 92,103, 131,
163
United States Army, 5-60, 192, 198;
Corps of Engineers, 303; supplies,
213-38. See also Mexican War.
United States Army in Taos, The,
1847-1852, by Lawrence R. Murphy,
33-48
United States Freehold Land and
Emigration Co., 163
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Unrau, William E., bk. rev. by, 291-93
Upson, Ash, 303
Urrea, Gen. Miguel, 17
Utah, 187, 189-90, 199
Ute Creek, 37
Ute Indians, 35-37,40-43
Valdez, Capt. J. M., 37
Valverde, N.M., 42
Van Horne, Maj. Jefferson, 215
Vargas, Diego de, 115, 117, 120, 130,
139
Vaught, J. S., 368
Vega, Cruz, 191, 194
Velez Cachupin, Tomas, 124-27, 132
Velarde, N.M., 34,42
Vermejo stage station, 198
Veterans, 331, 344, 345, 349, 365, 374;
Indian, 263-64
Vigil, Cornelio, 151-52, 153, 154, 159.
219
Vigil, Domingo, 122
Vigil, Juan Bautista, 186
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